



DRY GRASS

A Risk Assessment of Mass Atrocity in Uganda

Lina Zedriga Waru Abuku, Emily Sample, Ziad Al Achkar, Lucy Ernest Bolarinwa, Austin Brewer, Shelly Clay-Robison, Gbemiga Dasylva, Sofiyat Ibrahim, William Jennette, Bryant Lyttle, Christina McCormick, Tricia O'Neill, Justin Ober, Alexis Obodo, Lauren Riley, Gregory Sullivan, and Kathryn Wiglesworth



Co-Principle Investigates:

Lina Zedriga Waru Abuku & Emily Sample (Project Manager)

Authors:

Ziad Al Achkar, Lucy Ernest Bolarinwa, Austin Brewer, Shelly Clay-Robison, Gbemiga Dasylva, Sofiyat Ibrahim, William Jennette, Bryant Lyttle, Christina McCormick, Tricia O'Neill, Justin Ober, Alexis Obodo, Lauren Riley, Gregory Sullivan, and Kathryn Wigglesworth

With special thanks to Douglas Irvin-Erickson, James P. Finkel, Charles (Chip) Hauss, and Gretchen Sandles for their assistance and contributions to this report.

Cover photo courtesy of Micah & Avery Hughes

CONTENTS

I. Introduction

Conflict Map	5
Mass Atrocity Frameworks	6
Methodology	7

II. Regional Dynamics

Rwanda	11
Democratic Republic of Congo	11
South Sudan	13
Sudan	13
International Criminal Court	14
ICGLR and the African Union	14
Refugees	15

III. National Level Dynamics

IV. Structural Drivers of Conflict

Environment	23
Economy	26
Social Identity	27
Legal Processes (Transnational Peace Process).....	28

V. Major Issues

Gender Issues in Uganda	31
LGBTQ Groups	32
Youth Issues	33
Poverty as a Source of Instability	34
Psychosocial Issues in Uganda	34
DDR in Uganda (Former LRA combatants/abductees)	34
Religion	35
Education in Uganda	35

VI. Recommendations

VII. Appendix A: Context-Specific Indicators for Mass Atrocities in Uganda

VIII. Bibliography

INTRODUCTION

At George Mason University's School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, under the direction of Dr. Douglas Irvin-Erickson, the combined doctoral and master's level Engaging Conflict class conducted a risk assessment on the potential for a mass atrocity event in Uganda. This report is the conclusion of a 16-week course focused on research, interviews, and analysis of current risk factors on the ground. During this process, our team evaluated critical parts of existing mass atrocities frameworks and developed a context-specific framework using modified locally informed indicators.

Chapter one of this report analyzes the political dynamics in the Great Lakes Region. In analyzing these dynamics, it engages the discourse on Uganda and its relationship with its neighboring countries, the relationship that Uganda has with the International Criminal Court, and how these relationships could exacerbate or reduce the potential for mass atrocities, including issues pertaining to refugees and the local Ugandan population.


Chapter two captures the political policies and national dynamics in Uganda that can impact the potential for mass atrocities by highlighting the specific leverage points and mitigating factors for mass atrocities, specifically in governance and the regional areas of the country. This chapter examines the potential for conflict between current President Yoweri Museveni's National Resistance Movement (NRM) and the two major opposition parties,

the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) and the Democratic Party (DP).

Chapter three addresses structural violence by examining four core areas of the Ugandan issue- mainly economics, environment, social identity and legal processes and identifies how it can fuel the perpetuation of mass atrocities without conventional triggers or intentional perpetrators.

Chapter four discusses major issues in the society including, gender, youth and religion. The chapter evaluates the relationships that exist between these issues and how they relate to mass atrocities indicators and triggers. The major issues were drawn from interviews with local partners and supporting academic research.

Finally, three possible scenarios are developed, illustrating possible courses of events that could lead to atrocities. These three conflict triggers center around the possibility of violence surrounding elections, politics, and refugees. For each conflict trigger, recommendations are made to the United Nations and International Community, Ugandan government, ICGLR Regional Committee on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity and all forms of Discrimination, Grassroots/grass tops organizations, and NGO/CSOs. These recommendations focus on proactive reduction in the risk of mass atrocities in Uganda.



MASS ATROCITY FRAMEWORKS

Frameworks have the limitation of being subject to the understanding of those who produce them. This report circumvents this limitation by involving local populations and experts in Uganda in the creation of a unique framework. This mass atrocities framework will provide a mechanism to aid the understanding of atrocities by drawing from specific, locally-generated indicators. Additionally, it offers a rationale for its specificity; therefore, our Uganda-tailored mass atrocities framework speaks to the realities of the Ugandan conflict assessment rather than taking on a general assessment that other frameworks provide. While this report focuses on the relevance of the US government and the United Nation's mass atrocities frameworks, it is imperative to state that there are several existing frameworks available.¹

The United States' Mass Atrocities Prevention Framework is the U.S. government's response to states' deliberate neglect of the terms and definition of genocide and mass atrocities (Figure 2). Produced by the Atrocities Prevention Board, it is charged with prioritizing the deterrence and prevention of atrocities and genocide in the national security policy of the United States.² This framework was designed as an interagency tool for the U.S. government to quickly and cooperatively respond to mass atrocities and genocide as they unfold. However, one limitation of the framework is the absence of specific indicators meant to

help identify situations that can escalate into mass atrocities. This lack of specific, measurable indicators makes planning timely responses to atrocity crimes almost impossible.

The framework's main method for preventing and deterring expands the definition of genocide to include, "all large-scale and deliberate attacks on civilians" without recognizing that the paradox of responsibility to protect contradicts international norms of respecting state sovereignty.³ Drawing from this expanded term, the mass atrocities framework for this conflict assessment of Uganda is informed by the need to detect, prevent, and deter mass atrocities.

Additionally, the United Nations' Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes Prevention serves as an international standard for the definition and analysis of crimes of mass atrocity (Figure 3). The framework develops a list of risk factors for mass atrocity crimes and separates these crimes into three sub-categories: war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. Each category has a list of potential indicators in addition to the framework's universal indicators for atrocity crimes.⁴ As an expansion of the U.S. government's framework, it classifies activities that fall under the 'prevention' clause namely: root causes, precursors and risk factors. The inclusion of these specific risk factors and associated indicators improves on the applicability of the framework as compared to the U.S. government framework. The UN framework describes risk factors as conditions that increase the risk or susceptibility to negative outcomes. The framework's common risk factors for atrocity crimes include:

1 Ernesto Verdeja, "Predicting Genocide and Mass Atrocities," *Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal* 9, no. 3 (2016).

2 Office of the Press Secretary, "Remarks by the President at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum," press release (April 23, 2012).

3 Stephen Pomper, "Atrocity Prevention under the Obama Administration: What we Learned and the Path Ahead," February 2018: 3.

4 United Nations, "Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes: a tool for prevention," United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect (2014).




FIGURE 2



FIGURE 3

- Situations of armed conflict or other forms of instability
- Record of serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law
- Weakness of State structures
- Motives or incentives
- Capacity to commit atrocity crimes
- Absence of mitigating factors
- Enabling circumstances or preparatory action
- Triggering factors

These risk factors have their own individual indicators for analysis that aid the classification of these acts within the realm of atrocity crimes. These are the key attributes that the United States government's framework lacks. However, not all risk factors or indicators need to be present for an act of violence to be considered an atrocity crime.


The development of risk factors and examples of indicators are both a strength and a weakness

for any given framework. Given that conflicts are always context-specific, the wholesale application of any given framework to a different conflict context is bound to overlook the nuance and local specificity that otherwise contributes to meaningful early warning indicators. It is based on this that our indicators in relation to Uganda, beyond the provisions of the UN mass atrocities framework, must be drawn from the Ugandan context.

METHODOLOGY

Against the backdrop of the strengths and weaknesses of the frameworks reviewed, local and context-specific indicators and early warning signs are relevant to the discourse of mass atrocities framework methodology. Therefore, the strengths of the reviewed frameworks will be blended by using an adaptation of Everyday Peace Indicators (EPI) methodology.⁵ Scholarly literature illustrates

⁵ In her 2018 book, *Reclaiming Everyday Peace: Local Voices in Measurement and Evaluation After War*, Pamina Firchow illustrates the powerful role that Everyday Peace Indicator (EPI) methodology plays in understanding conflict



the importance of local involvement in the development of successful peace programming as well as in its evaluation.⁶ Using EPI methodology requires indicators for deciphering evidence and likelihood of mass atrocities to be locally sourced at various levels, from a village or region, to ensure that they are as locally defined and context-specific as possible, thus increasing the validity of the process and results.⁷

This report adapts the EPI methodology to source potential indicators and early warning signs for mass violence in Uganda from interviews with local citizens, as well as independent database and media research. For this report to be contextually

relevant, and therefore more successful at predicting and monitoring risks of mass atrocities in Uganda, indicators for mass violence had to be sourced in part from the local populations in relation to their local knowledge and lived experiences. To validate the report without on-the-ground access to the local population, the team used the knowledge of local partners through series of interviews in the development and review of the indicators.

EPI is a methodology that increases the contextual relevance of how local populations define concepts relating to peace, conflict and atrocities; therefore, it brings a certain level of

through the lens of the local population, especially to monitor the impact of conflict resolution programs in post-and conflict spaces.

6 Cheyanne Church and Mark M. Rogers, "Designing for Results: Integrating Monitoring and Evaluation into Conflict Transformation Programs," Search for Common Ground, 2006.

7 Pamina Firchow, *Reclaiming Everyday Peace: Local Voices in Measurement and Evaluation After War*, Cambridge University Press, 2018.

validity upon the indicators drawn from this group of respondents. The indicators that are sourced from local interlocutors will be more contextually relevant, and therefore better equipped for analysis of the specific conflict context. Ideally, EPI structured field research should occur; however, given funding and time constraints, to produce this report, indicators were developed based on our research, and verified through a series of expert interviews.⁸


The methods for developing indicators are based on two factors: first, open source database and media research, and second, interviews with local partners. Interview responses, specifically to questions about likely causes of violence and why, as well as likely regions that could experience the escalation of violence and why, are analyzed and coded thematically to develop and verify potential indicators. These indicators are then cross-referenced with the indicators developed from independent research, in order to develop a locally sourced and verified list of indicators of potential mass atrocities in Uganda. Using knowledge of Uganda and structural drivers of conflict, potential indicators are developed and sorted into broad analytical categories (Figure 4). These categories are:

- Human Rights and Liberties
- Resource Allocation and Poverty
- Opportunity and Access
- Regional and Structural Stressors

In Human Rights and Liberties the indicators address political prisoners, political regimes, media censorship, rights to assembly, and levels of violence against journalists and political opponents. Resource Allocation and Poverty includes indicators that assess access to clean

water, food insecurity, and rates of poverty. Similarly, Opportunity and Access indicators measure unemployment, crime, and education within youth populations, systematic oppression of women and the LGBTQ+ community, gender-based violence, and DDR processes. And finally, Regional and Structural Stressors include numbers of refugees and IDPs, corruption, death in armed conflicts, rates of urbanization, and attitudes toward minority groups. The complete list of indicators can be found in Appendix A, and will be referenced throughout the report.

⁸ Our methodology detailed how Ugandans perceived everyday challenges and how individuals and groups would likely describe conflict in their community. Ugandans are asked questions that require them to identify forces or systems that reinforces conflict and peace as defined by them. They also responded to questions on areas in Uganda that they think are prone to violence and what they think are contributing to the conflict. This is how we drew out our indicators and triggers.



CHAPTER 2: REGIONAL DYNAMICS

Photo taken at a refugee camp near Yumbe district. Courtesy of Micah & Avery Hughes

CHAPTER RELEVANT INDICATORS

INDICATOR 20

NUMBER OF REFUGEES IN X AREA IN Y TIME

INDICATOR 23

NUMBER OF PEOPLE KILLED IN ARMED CONFLICTS IN NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES OF SIMILAR ETHNIC, RELIGIOUS, AND BROADER IDENTITY COMPOSITION

INDICATOR 21

NUMBER OF IDP'S IN X AREA IN Y TIME

REGIONAL LEVEL DYNAMICS

Regional stability is an important factor in cases of mass violence and political upheaval. Uganda is located in a region that is, for a variety of factors, unstable and prone to violence. This chapter looks at its neighboring countries and relates how the conflicts in these areas may impact Uganda's stability and increase the risk of mass atrocity in the country.

RWANDA

Uganda and Rwanda share a complex and intertwined history and tensions between them have recently escalated. The border between the two countries has been closed with several sources in Uganda claiming that Rwanda closed the border because of accusations that Uganda continues to harbor Rwandan dissidents.⁹ The group Uganda is accused of housing have voiced

intent to overthrow the government in Kigali.¹⁰ Major grievances from the government of Uganda include the planting of Rwandan spies in the Ugandan security apparatus.¹¹ The closure of the border has disrupted trade as goods are held at the border leading to a loss of revenue for Ugandan farmers and with food shortages and rising prices continuing in Rwanda, the conflict continues to escalate. Continued tensions between these two former allies could have region-wide repercussions if trade and border relations do not normalize, in addition to localized resource scarcity putting pressure on communities reliant on trade.

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

Uganda's influence and intervention in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Congo-Kinshasa/DRC) since the 1990s has been the subject of continued scrutiny. Uganda is suspected of supplying arms and training to rebel groups to maintain a steady stream of minerals and income from the war-torn region of the DRC and has taken in about 50,000 refugees.¹² It is

⁹ Kampala Post, "Uganda-Rwanda Border Closure: Rwandan Citizens Demand Answers from President Kagame," April 3, 2019, <https://kampalapost.com/content/news/uganda-rwanda-border-closure-rwandan-citizens-demand-answers-president-kagame>.

¹⁰ Sella Oneko, "Rwanda and Uganda – neighbors at loggerheads," DW, March 6, 2019, <https://www.dw.com/en/rwanda-and-uganda-neighbors-at-loggerheads/a-47793883>.

¹¹ Ivan M. Ashaba and Gerald Berebe, "Closed borders and fighting words: Rwanda and Uganda's deepening rift," African Arguments, March 12, 2019, <https://africanarguments.org/2019/03/12/closed-border-fighting-words-rwanda-uganda-rift/>.

¹² International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, "Crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo," <http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/crisis-in-drc#rebel>.

RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN REGIONAL ACTORS




FIGURE 4

estimated that roughly 75% of the gold Uganda sells abroad came from mines they seized from the DRC during war.¹³ This indicates a clear involvement of Uganda into the affairs of the DRC and provides an economic incentive for the government to continue supporting instability in the north eastern provinces of DRC.¹⁴

The presence of natural resources in neighboring countries is a major factor that incentivizes external intervention to loot resources. Excursions into a neighboring country may cause regional instability, generating internally displaced populations and refugees, which may

be an early indicator of mass atrocity (indicators 20 and 21). Large influxes of refugees can exacerbate land scarcity, that can lead to clashes with local population, as previously outlined. The fixed endowments of Kisangani in DRC that incentivized fighting between intervening Ugandan and Rwandan armed forces also highlight the cross-border conflicts involving pastoralist activities in Uganda.

Electoral violence, civil war, and disease pose security threats along the Ugandan-Congo border. A report issued by the World Health Organization (WHO) indicated that cases of

¹³ Lisa Dupuy and Klaas van Dijken, "Investigating DR Congo's illegal gold trade," DW, January 8, 2019, <https://www.dw.com/en/investigating-dr-congos-illegal-gold-trade/a-46997332>.

¹⁴ Isabella Bauer, "Uganda's hidden role in Congo's conflict," DW, January 4, 2019, <https://www.dw.com/en/ugandas-hidden-role-in-congos-conflict/a-16494434>.

Ebola along the DRC border with Uganda have increased in the past months.¹⁵ The porous border raises concerns within the WHO that the disease could spread to Uganda. The WHO is also tracking a new outbreak of Pneumonic plague along the Uganda-Congo border. The disease has the potential to spread quickly, yet the situation in Uganda is currently under control with close supervision by the WHO.¹⁶

The outbreaks in the DRC, as well as the ongoing rebel activity in the area along the border with Uganda, caused some electoral strife in the most recent Congolese election. The violence caused by the inability of some Congolese provinces to vote has not crossed the border into Uganda. However, due to the violence and the outbreaks there has been a steady stream of refugees crossing the Uganda-Congo border.¹⁷ The phenomena of porous borders, refugees, and electoral violence as indicators of mass violence are highlighted in the indicators 20 and 23.

SOUTH SUDAN

Uganda has served as an important contributor to the government of South Sudan in the ongoing conflict. Uganda's role in the conflict has been controversial due to their logistical assistance to the Sudan People Liberation Army (SPLA) who has reportedly committed numerous atrocities against the Nuer people.-government Dinka population has welcomed Ugandan support

and sees the Ugandan People Defense Force (UPDF) as a deterrent to being victimized by rebel forces. They, however, still provide logistical support to the South Sudanese government and pro-government militias. Despite the position of support for the Kiir government of South Sudan Uganda has been accused of funneling arms to both major parties to the civil war. Reports have claimed that Uganda violated multiple arms embargos on South Sudan by selling arms and providing logistical support to rebel groups as well as government forces.¹⁸ To establish more secure economic ties with South Sudan, Uganda and the government of Sudan supported formal peace talks and the implementation of a cease-fire between the rebel groups and the government of South Sudan.¹⁹ Continued instability in South Sudan increases refugee pressure on Northern Uganda (Indicator 20) and puts the country at increased risk of cross-border attacks (indicators 23 and 24). Continued instability in South Sudan increases refugee pressure on Northern Uganda (indicator 20) and puts the country at increased risk of cross-border attacks (indicators 23 and 24).

SUDAN

Sudan and Uganda maintain a tense relationship. Diplomatic relations between the two countries were severed in 1995, due in part to claims that the government of Sudan was supporting the Lord's Resistance Army.²⁰ As of time of writing long time president of Sudan, Omar Al-Bashir, has been

15 World Health Organization, "Ebola Virus Disease: Democratic Republic of the Congo," External Situation Report 35, April 2, 2019, https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/311641/SITREP_EVD_DRC_20190331-eng.pdf.

16 Al Jazeera, "WHO: Deadly plague breaks out on Uganda-Congo border," March 14, 2019, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/03/deadly-plague-breaks-uganda-congo-border-190314075949596.html>.

17 Walter Kigali and Catherine Wachiyaya, "Refugees flee fresh fighting in Congo to Uganda," UNHCR, February 13, 2018, <https://www.unhcr.org/news/stories/2018/2/5a81779e4/refugees-flee-fresh-fighting-congo-uganda.html>.

18 Max Bearak, "Uganda breached arms embargo in funneling European weapons to South Sudan, report says," The Washington Post, November 29, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2018/11/29/uganda-funneled-european-weapons-south-sudan-breaching-arms-embargo-report/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.1f88f225d005.

19 Council on Foreign Relations, "Civil War in South Sudan," Global Conflict Tracker, accessed May 5, 2019, <https://cfr.org/interactive/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/civil-war-south-sudan>.

20 Council on Foreign Relations, "Civil War in South Sudan," Global Conflict Tracker, accessed May 5, 2019, <https://cfr.org/interactive/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/civil-war-south-sudan>.

removed from his office and placed under arrest by the Sudanese military.²¹ Military governmental control could lead to greater amounts of civil unrest within the country which could have negative repercussions on the surrounding states. Instability could lead to increased refugee flows into South Sudan and Uganda (Indicator 20), as well as the potential for an increase in regionally active insurgent groups (Indicators 23 and 24).

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT

Uganda's relationship with the International Criminal Court (ICC) has been tumultuous since becoming a signing member. On more than one occasion, President Museveni hosted Omar Al-Bashir; both visits occurred while there was an active warrant for Al-Bashir from the ICC to answer for his government's actions in the Darfur region of Sudan.²² This oversight and lack of compliance has been the basis of global criticism about Uganda's commitment to the ICC mandate.

Uganda is currently under investigation in the ICC regarding crimes against humanity and war crimes that were allegedly committed by the Ugandan military in the campaign against the Lord's Resistance Army.²³ This investigation

is ongoing, with a member of the LRA on trial and several other prominent LRA officials still at large. Uganda is currently party to two separate cases within the ICC, one currently on trial, and one accused member of a case with an active warrant still at large.²⁴

Uganda has also been involved in criminal cases and complaints brought up in the International Court of Justice. The DRC brought charges in the ICJ against Uganda and its neighboring countries for violating Congolese sovereignty and looting Congolese resources.²⁵ A UN report published in 2010 implicated Uganda in committing war crimes and other crimes against humanity.²⁶ As these cases come to trial and judgement, there is potential for the Ugandan government to attempt to discredit or censor the results (Indicator 3) or the judgement could incite protests in Uganda (Indicator 4).

ICGLR AND THE AFRICAN UNION

Uganda became a founding member of the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) in 2004.²⁷ The ICGLR established a protocol for the prevention of genocide in 2006 and established the ICGLR Regional Committee on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide,

21 BBC, "Sudan Military Coup Topples Bashir," April 11, 2019, sec. Africa, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-47891470>.

22 Lino Owor Ogora, "Uganda's Ambiguous Relationship with the ICC Amidst Ongwen's Trial," International Justice Monitor, December 11, 2017, <https://www.ijmonitor.org/2017/12/ugandas-ambiguous-relationship-with-the-icc-amidst-ongwens-trial/>.

23 International Criminal Court, "Situation in Uganda," accessed May 5, 2019, <https://www.icc-cpi.int/uganda>.

24 International Criminal Court, "Situation in Uganda," accessed May 5, 2019, <https://www.icc-cpi.int/uganda>.

25 International Court of Justice, "Latest Developments | Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda) | International Court of Justice," accessed May 5, 2019, <https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/116>.

26 Democratic Republic of the Congo, 1993-2003. August 2010 (unofficial translation). https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/CD/DRC_MAPPING_REPORT_FINAL_EN.pdf

27 ICGLR, "International Conference on Peace, Security, Democracy and Development in the Great Lakes Region," November 19, 2004, http://www.icglr.org/images/Dar_Es_Salaam_Declaration_on_Peace_Security_Democracy_and_Development.pdf.

ICGLR MEMBER STATES



War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity and all forms of Discrimination in 2010.²⁸

The regional committee however noted the lack of funds for the committee and the need to strengthen the committee's ability to investigate potential crimes.²⁹ The lack of enforcement mechanism within the ICGLR and "real teeth" undermines the ability of the regional body to ensure that mass atrocities are prevented and prosecuted when they occur.

These organizations provide frameworks for accountability to which Uganda is beholden to maintain a certain standard of democracy, stability, and violence prevention. There are concerns that organizations continue to support Uganda despite the country's crackdown on public assembly and freedom of speech even with the countries continuous abuse of its citizens freedoms. Uganda is also a prominent member of the African Union (AU). Uganda is a primary supplier of troops to many of the AU missions, most notably the AU mission in Somalia (AMISOM).³⁰ Participation in these types of missions' places Uganda in a position of power on the continent as a giver of aid. It also places Uganda as a potential target of insurgent groups who feel Uganda is overstepping sovereignty, as well as domestic groups who may feel that government focus should remain inside Uganda. Participation in these types of missions places Uganda in a position of power on the continent as a giver of aid. It also places Uganda as a potential target of insurgent groups who feel Uganda is overstepping sovereignty, as well as domestic groups who may feel that government focus should remain inside Uganda.

REFUGEES

As a result of surrounding regional conflicts, Uganda is home to over 1.2 million refugees from South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.³¹ Indicator 20 outlines that hosting refugees places specific pressures on both local and governmental resources, especially if refugee camps become long-term. According to the latest

²⁸ ICGLR, "Genocide Prevention," accessed May 5, 2019, <http://www.icglr.org/index.php/en/genocide-prevention>

²⁹ ICGLR, "Recommendations of the ICGLR Committee on Genocide Prevention to the RIMC during the Summit in December, 2011," December 2011, <http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/Zanzibarpdf.pdf>.

³⁰ AMISOM, "African Union Hails Uganda for Its Contribution in Stabilizing Somalia," April 5, 2017, <http://amisom-au.org/2017/04/african-union-hails-uganda-for-its-contribution-in-stabilizing-somalia/>.


³¹ UNHCR, "Uganda Comprehensive Refugee Response Portal," Accessed on April 9, 2019. <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/country/uga>

available data from the UNHCR, only 57% of funding needed was raised in 2018, and the UN agency warns that its budget at the start of 2019 is 32% less than the prior year. These gaps leave shortages in food, education, and protection for hundreds of thousands of refugees; gaps that are often filled by putting pressure on local Ugandan resources.³²

A recent audit of UNHCR in Uganda found multiple cases of fraud that involved Ugandan officials. There were irregularities between UNHCR office in Uganda and the Office of Prime Minister, prompting serious claims of corruption and fraud.³³ The report documents evidence of corruption, fraud, and potential embezzlement by Ugandan officials in the mismanagement of UNHCR refugee funds.³⁴ Backlash from the misappropriation of UN funds for refugees included threats to withdrawal funding from major donors such as the United States and the European Union, which would increase the pressure on the local and national budgets.³⁵ This embezzlement and high refugee population are measured in indicators 22 and 20, respectively.

Violence in refugee camps has led to multiple fatalities following clashes between refugees from the Dinka and Nuer Tribes.³⁶ There is a real concern that violence within refugee camps

ORIGIN OF REFUGEE POPULATION



Data taken from UNHCR Refugee Response Portal, last updated March 31, 2019.³⁷

along ethnic lines could spread throughout Northern Uganda and throughout the refugee camps if it is not managed properly (indicator 23). In a survey conducted by the International Rescue Committee, 33% of those polled indicated that they had interacted with a refugee in Uganda.³⁸ A large part of those polled, 91%, believe that the government of Uganda has

32 UNHCR, "Uganda Operational Update," January 2019 <http://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/UNHCR%20Uganda%20Operational%20Update%20-%20January%202019.pdf>

33 Ben Parker, "Audit finds UN refugee agency critically mismanaged donor funds in Uganda," IRIN news, November 28, 2018, <https://www.irinnews.org/news/2018/11/28/audit-finds-un-refugee-agency-critically-mismanaged-donor-funds-uganda>

34 UNHCR, "UN OIOS Internal Audit Division Report 2018/097," Audit of the operations in Uganda for the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, October 17, 2018.

35 Institute for Security Studies, "How Uganda and UNHCR Failed Refugees - Uganda," ReliefWeb, accessed May 5, 2019, <https://reliefweb.int/report/uganda/how-uganda-and-unhcr-failed-refugees>.

36 Samuel Okinor, "Ethnic tensions rise in Uganda as World Cup row leaves four refugees dead," The Guardian, June 21, 2018, <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2018/jun/21/ethnic-tensions-rise-in-uganda-as-world-cup-row-leaves-four-refugees-dead>
<https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2018/jun/21/ethnic-tensions-rise-in-uganda-as-world-cup-row-leaves-four-refugees-dead>

37 "Uganda Comprehensive Refugee Response Portal," UNHCR, Accessed May 05, 2019, <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/country/uga>.

38 International Rescue Committee, "Uganda: Citizen's perceptions on Refugees," June 19, 2018.

taken on a larger part of the burden to hosting refugees in comparison to other countries. 81% of Ugandans polled believe the government has been welcoming of refugees and has overall done a good job. 60% of those polled noted that it helps those in needs, while 19% believe that hosting refugees is a burden on the country's natural and monetary resources. 8% believe that refugees pose a security threat, whereas 5% believe that it creates competition for job opportunities.³⁹

However, there are increasing concerns of clashes between refugees and the local populations as result of massive deforestation.⁴⁰ Refugee and host communities compete for the same natural resources, which causes tensions between the two communities.⁴¹ They are both heavily reliant on natural resources (land, water, wood) for their livelihood. This places an emphasis on the need for a plan to combat the risk of resource depletion and a more harmonious approach for use of natural resources between the two communities to reduce the risk of a flare up in tensions (Indicator 20).

In interviews, great concerns about corruption from the government in handling the humanitarian aid that they are receiving was highlighted (Indicator 22). They are critical of the government for failing to help local communities who were promised to see benefits from this aid. The interlocutors were concerned about price increases and perception that this is attributed to refugee demand for the


same goods. Additional concerns included job competition from refugees. Additionally, the people interviewed shared a concern that refugees would be allowed to participate in the 2021 elections although they are not citizens.

Potential indicators of violence in Uganda revolve around the clustered number of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the varying regions of Uganda (indicators 20 and 21). These also correlate to rising violence in neighboring areas that have a direct impact on Ugandan governmental and societal stability. Any fluctuation could set off a chain reaction of violence within Uganda's borders.

39 International Rescue Committee, "Uganda: Citizen's perceptions on Refugees," June 19, 2018.

40 Samuel Okiror, "Massive deforestation by refugees in Uganda sparks clashes with local people," *The Guardian*, February 18, 2019.

41 World Bank, "Rapid Assessment of Natural Resources Degradation in Areas Impacted by the South Sudan Refugee Influx in Northern Uganda," October 2018, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/620681548863607633/pdf/134195-WP-P124296-Rapid-Refugee-N-Uganda-Assessment-Report-FINAL.pdf?fbclid=IwAR1RIH4x8i2BAz8pCrZgKVtgBnt1y_5K8hh3mspI55d0k_zlXwdmQZ1q_DQ.



CHAPTER 3: NATIONAL LEVEL DYNAMICS

Police presence at a campaign rally outside Mbarara, October 2013

CHAPTER RELEVANT INDICATORS

INDICATOR 4

ABILITY TO HOLD PROTESTS & DEMONSTRATE

INDICATOR 3

LEVEL OF CENSORSHIP & ACCESS TO MEDIA & INTERNET

INDICATOR 2

TYPE OF POLITICAL REGIME

INDICATOR 1

NUMBER OF INDIVIDUALS ARRESTED AS POLITICAL PRISONERS

INDICATOR 7

LEVEL OF VIOLENCE AGAINST OPPOSITION CANDIDATES

NATIONAL LEVEL DYNAMICS

This chapter focuses on points of contention in the politics of Uganda and how that plays out across the various regions of the country. Based on the framework and indicators, emphasis is placed on how local cultural leaders interact with the Ugandan government, the consequences, both positive and negative, for these interactions, and what it means for the groups that belong to these kingdoms. In the last three decades, Uganda has been hailed as an “African success story” by international financial institutions, development agencies, and international and bilateral donors, while the reality is that the reforms that have been mandated in country mask the negative socio-economic impacts that continue to affect several communities in the region. Thus, it is pertinent to address some of the underlying political dynamics in the region in order to understand the roles they play in acerbating the potential for a mass atrocity event.

Uganda has historically been home to six kingdoms, primarily in the south and western parts of the country: Buganda, Bunyoro, Rwenzururu, Toro, Busoga, and Ankole. Despite many of the kingdom's disbanding in 1967, the Busoga Kingdom however continued to maintain some autonomy and now has relatively positive relations with the government. Opposition parties continue to consider this territory a primary ground for campaigning leading to the opposition parties finding themselves at odds with the Ugandan authorities within the territory, and events have been cancelled or rerouted entirely as a result of campaign violence. Because of this, the Bugosa territory sees regular clashes between opposition party supporters and Ugandan police in the region, a clear indicator of violence in this region, especially during an election year (indicators 4 and 7).⁴²

President Museveni is from Buganda, the largest kingdom and ethnic group in Uganda. Despite the power and presence Buganda enjoys in the current government, there has been recent tension particularly in the Eastern African Community and political confederation. The concept of political confederation across multiple countries is seen as a threat to the continued existence of constitutional monarchies within Uganda.⁴³ Buganda is not alone however, in seeing a rise of

⁴² Philip Wafula, "Uganda: What Is Opposition's Game Plan for Busoga Ahead of 2021 Polls?" *The Monitor* (Kampala), April 12, 2019, . <https://allafrica.com/stories/201904120092.html>.

⁴³ Kavuma Kaggwa, "Buganda and EAC Political Federation," *The Independent Uganda: (blog)*, April 11, 2019, <https://www.independent.co.ug/buganda-and-eac-political-federation/>.

ethnic pride and nationalist attitudes towards their ethnic kingdom.

The Toro Kingdom has also had a troubled history with the Ugandan government over the last five years. Frustrations have risen among the youth in the Tooro kingdom through an organization known as Amacumu ne Bitara, they have regularly protested the government.

In the Rwenzururu Kingdom, which borders the Democratic Republic of Congo, there has been instability between provincial leaders and the government in Kampala. With rising discontent and tensions between the Bakonzo people against the Ugandan government, the Rwenzururu Kingdom is a location that is also at risk for violence. In Bugosa, this would likely be part of a larger scale event targeting parties in opposition to the ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM) as Bugosa is home to a modest supporter base of the FDC and DP opposition parties.⁴⁴

In Buganda, Rwenzururu, and Toro the rise of armed ethno-centric groups of youths such as the Amacumu ne Bitara in Tooro and a Bakonzo identity movement in Rwenzururu could lead to mass violence either by local groups enacting violence against minority groups within the region, i.e., Bakonzo violence against Bugandans in the Rwenzururu territory, or by the largely Bugandan government against the native Bakonzo.⁴⁵ With the upcoming 2021

UGANDA'S FIVE KINGDOMS



election, a Museveni win may trigger violence on both political and ethnic levels depending on the locale.⁴⁶

Uganda's political and security sphere outside of its kingdoms is also dominated by trends of exclusion, nepotism and corruption. These issues often fall along ethnic or regional lines, which serves to exacerbate existing cleavages and inequalities in opportunities and representation.⁴⁷ In addition to formal financial structures of corruption, networks of families and personal patronages also impact the administration of government services. These trends are present in governmental organizations and structures, as well as the

44 Kavuma Kaggwa, "Buganda and EAC Political Federation," The Independent Uganda: (blog), April 11, 2019, <https://www.independent.co.ug/buganda-and-eac-political-federation/>.

45 Ruth Katusabe, Felix Basiima, and Risdell Kasasira, "10 Arrested as Tooro Youth, Police Clash," Daily Monitor, June 17, 2014, <https://mobile.monitor.co.ug/News/Toro-youth-fault-Museveni-over-remarks-on-King-Oyo/2466686-2350734-format-xhtml-a6k4od/index.html>.

46 Ruth Katusabe, Felix Basiima, and Risdell Kasasira, "10 Arrested as Tooro Youth, Police Clash," Daily Monitor, June 17, 2014, <https://mobile.monitor.co.ug/News/Toro-youth-fault-Museveni-over-remarks-on-King-Oyo/2466686-2350734-format-xhtml-a6k4od/index.html>.

47 Raphaël Franck and Ilia Rainer, "Does the Leader's Ethnicity Matter? Ethnic Favoritism, Education, and Health in Sub-Saharan Africa," *The American Political Science Review* 106, no. 2 (2012): 294–325.

military. Corruption also impacts relationships between local armed forces, paramilitary, police and intelligence agencies (indicator 22).⁴⁸ The disagreement between these groups regarding jurisdiction and legitimacy can lead to unequal military and policing.

President Museveni uses his control of the military to limit Ugandans' ability to hold protests and demonstrations and to enact voter suppression tactics (indicators 4 and 7). The government in Uganda makes political and social activism difficult, censoring and arresting citizens for their participation in any kind of social activism in order to prevent further dissemination (indicators 4 and 7). Despite this oppression, Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) have stepped in to administrative services like health care and infrastructure. Worryingly, as civil servants get replaced by military officers, the public sector has become increasingly militaristic. If the military is successful in taking over a significant number of branches of government and civil service sectors, opportunity and access to both jobs and the necessary services (indicators 14-19) could lead to a boomerang effect of unrest and violent suppression of protest.

Recent suppression tactics include the threat to popular musician and cultural icon Bobi Wine, whose real name is Robert Kyagulanyi (indicator 7). Wine is a 36-year old whose relatable rags-to-riches story gained huge popularity throughout the nation. His music in recent years have been notably more political while also providing comfort and hope towards the possibility of a progressive Uganda. He is currently a member

of Parliament of the Wasiko District in Uganda's Central Region. In 2018, he was arrested and imprisoned on charges of possession of firearms, attacking the president's limo with rocks, and inciting violence out against the government.⁴⁹ During his detention, images of Wine's physical abuse sparked more calls for demonstrations and birthed the political social movement 'Free Bobi Wine'. He was acquitted three days later, rearrested and later released due to the large uproar from political activists as well as supporters.⁵⁰

Most recently, on April 29, 2019, Wine was rearrested on charges of rallying political opposition protests which Museveni deemed as illegal (indicators 1, 2, 4, and 7). Under the scope of Museveni's lens, these actions are grounds for treason. Wine's mistreatment from the Ugandan government highlights the conflict of Museveni's strong connection to dogmatism along with the ability to single-handedly target communities who voice their frustration towards the government. It is important to recognize this friction when we discuss the political situation in Uganda as these are very real indicators of potential violence in the region.

48 Roger Tangri and Andrew M. Mwenda, "Elite Corruption and Politics in Uganda," *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics* 46, no. 2 (April 1, 2008): 177-94, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14662040802005336>.

49 Samson Ntale and David McKenzie, "Ugandan Popstar and Opposition Politician Bobi Wine Jailed," CNN, accessed May 5, 2019, <https://www.cnn.com/2019/04/29/africa/ugandan-bobi-wine-arrested-intl/index.html>.

50 Siobahn O'Grady, "'The Orders Were Clear to Brutalize Me.' Ugandan Pop Star Turned Opposition Politician Says He Was Tortured by Soldiers," *The Washington Post*, September 6, 2018, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2018/09/06/orders-were-clear-brutalize-me-ugandan-pop-star-turned-opposition-politician-says-he-was-tortured-by-soldiers/>.

The background features an aerial photograph of a city, showing various buildings and greenery. A prominent green diagonal band runs from the top-left to the bottom-right. A white arrow shape points from the left towards the right, containing the chapter title. The text is in a bold, black, sans-serif font.

CHAPTER 4: STRUCTURAL DRIVERS

CHAPTER RELEVANT INDICATORS

INDICATOR 2

TYPE OF POLITICAL REGIME

INDICATOR 22

CORRUPTION PERCEPTION

INDICATOR 9

NUMBER OF UGANDANS THAT EXPERIENCE FOOD INSECURITY

INDICATOR 12

HISTORY OF COMMUNITY VIOLENCE IN IMPOVERISHED AREAS

INDICATOR 13

RATE OF POVERTY BY ETHNIC GROUP

STRUCTURAL DRIVERS

This report has outlined practices and policies that could drive Uganda towards a mass atrocity event. Without understanding the driving forces that enable such practices and policies to be adopted, there is a risk of overlooking potential leverage points for mass atrocity prevention. While short-term events and government regimes are often monitoring points for mass atrocity triggers, social, economic, legal, and environmental drivers enable conditions that lead could to mass atrocity over time.

Structural violence can lead to outbreaks of violent conflict without conventional triggers or intentional perpetrators,⁵¹ and is reinforced by societal power dynamics, which may result in economic underdevelopment and poverty for a significant part of the population.⁵² Additionally, it can determine the conditions under which individuals feel that their needs are not being met, often disproportionately impacting specific groups. It is also necessary to recognize that many Ugandans may feel that these structural conditions are normal, but when their access to fundamental needs become inhibited by power dynamics, violence may erupt with seemingly little warning. The warning signals are not invisible, but rather normalized. The power dynamics in Uganda are stratified and multi-dimensional, ultimately leading to aggression when stratified groups seek to rectify their status. When this stratification is perpetuated on a mass scale, the result can be a mass atrocity event.

This chapter examines the impact of structural violence in Uganda and the relationship between these systems and mass atrocity. Specifically, it will look at the structural drivers of conflict in Uganda that are determined by environmental, economic, social, and legal conditions; these drivers often occur in tandem and are mutually reinforcing in nature.

ENVIRONMENT

Assessing the structural environmental conditions in Uganda is key

⁵¹ Johan Galtung, "Violence, peace, and peace research," *Journal of peace research* 6, no. 3 (1969): 167-191.

⁵² Johan Galtung, "Cultural violence," *Journal of peace research* 27, no. 3 (1990): 291-305.

to preventing a mass atrocity event. Under environmental scarcity conditions, overall societal wealth decreases; while Ugandan elites may use their structural advantages to maintain living standards, less privileged groups may be denied access to resources or basic human conditions.⁵³ Environmental scarcity may emerge in growing populations and locations where resources are unequally distributed, depleted, or degraded.⁵⁴

Environmental conditions may lead to food insecurity in agriculture intensive regions. Inter-tribal conflict over land and water issues can escalate into a mass atrocity event if resource scarcity and environmental resilience are weakened by climate change. The primary causes of environmental degradation are attributed to poor farming techniques, asymmetrical gender relations, demographic pressures, limited non-farming opportunities for generating income, inefficient energy sources, and armed conflict. While the Ugandan government has announced policies to mitigate environmental degradation, heavy depletion of natural resources suggests policies are not effectively enforced. Natural resources depletion compounds environmental conditions as most Ugandans depend on the environment for sustenance and production.

As a result of the environmental issues in the country, socio-environmental conflicts have emerged over resource mismanagement, particularly in northern territories most susceptible to climate change. The accessibility of mineral and oil deposits provides an attractive incentive for the Ugandan government to extract and export these materials. The Ugandan government's political continuity reduces accountability and the need to reinvest profits from natural resource export among the population (indicator 2). Instead, the Ugandan government co-opts natural endowments that would have reduced poverty, provided employment, livelihood, and food security. Ugandans perceive misallocation and inequitable distribution of resources as an overextension of government and elite power (indicator 22). In addition to local health risks and environmental degradation from extractive operations, these environmental conditions exacerbate the possibility of local violence.

USAID reports that environmental degradation is Uganda's greatest challenge, with high population growth, deforestation, lack of alternative fuel sources, wildlife tracking, and expansion of oil explorations in

⁵³ Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, "On the threshold: environmental changes as causes of acute conflict," *International security* 16, no. 2 (1991): 76-116.

⁵⁴ Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, "On the threshold: environmental changes as causes of acute conflict," *International security* 16, no. 2 (1991): 76-116.

CHAPTER RELEVANT INDICATORS

INDICATOR 21

ABILITY TO HOLD PROTESTS & DEMONSTRATE

INDICATOR 16

ABILITY TO HOLD PROTESTS & DEMONSTRATE

INDICATOR 17


ABILITY TO HOLD PROTESTS & DEMONSTRATE

INDICATOR 15

ABILITY TO HOLD PROTESTS & DEMONSTRATE

INDICATOR 12

ABILITY TO HOLD PROTESTS & DEMONSTRATE



Rapid deforestation in Uganda has reduced forested landscape from 24% in the 1990s to 8% as of 2018⁵⁵

the Albertine Rift Valley contributing to this degradation.⁵⁶ Basic needs, such as food, water, shelter, energy, health, and employment, are closely tied to natural resources. The Karamoja region is especially at risk from environmental drivers, including anti-pastoralist policies that have led to loss of herding land, government misallocation of resources, and susceptibility to

climate events, including recurring droughts and flash floods which have limited development.⁵⁷ Governance factors, as well as availability of firearms, cattle raiding, weak infrastructure, and limited services delivery were adversarial factors in the civil war (indicators 9 and 12). Active risk factors include water scarcity and land tensions over refugee resettlement in pastoralist and agriculture-intensive areas.

These land resource conditions foster practices that have the potential to enhance conflict among the different actors in Uganda's emerging oil and agricultural industry. When Uganda discovered oil and gas resources in 2006, the government began the process of transitioning the sector from exploration to appraisal, to developing the market for full production and commercialization.⁵⁸ Ideally, the discovery of oil for commercial development would increase job opportunities, raise incomes, improve roads, and improve access to improved public services. However, rampant corruption, poor governance, and weak institutional capacity exposed Ugandans to the negative consequences of the newly discovered oil and gas industry (indicators 22 and 13).

Uganda's oil exploration has been dominated by a lack of transparency, corruption, and a failure to engage with local communities. As a result of this, increased feelings of marginalization and

⁵⁵ Wilson Manishimwe. "Uganda's Forest Cover Depleted to 8%, Environment Minister Warns Encroachers," *New Vision*, April 20, 2018, https://www.newvision.co.ug/new_vision/news/1476085/uganda-forest-cover-depleted-environment-minister-warns-encroachers, Accessed May 5, 2019.

⁵⁶ USAID Climate Risk Profile: Uganda. United States Institute for Peace. https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/170130_Karamoja_Food_Security_Climate_Screening.pdf

⁵⁷ USAID Climate Risk Profile: Uganda. United States Institute for Peace. https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/170130_Karamoja_Food_Security_Climate_Screening.pdf

⁵⁸ IOL, "Uganda Announces Oil Discovery," October 2006, <https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/uganda-announces-oil-discovery-296822>.

exclusion have multiplied.⁵⁹ The discovery of oil and gas available for commercialization attracts local, national, and international actors, including the Albertine Graben Refinery Consortium (AGRC) led by U.S.-based General Electric who signed a \$4 billion oil refinery deal with the Ugandan government in 2018.⁶⁰ The Hoima district is presently the most affected region, where residents depend on fishing as a major source of income. Additionally, the commercialization of oil in the Albertine Rift region has led to several displacements causing harm to the communities and in some cases arousing ethno-nationalist attitudes as people are displaced to an ethnically different part of the country (indicators 13 and 21).

ECONOMY

Economic downturn can exacerbate structural economic drivers, including tapping into ethno-national frustration. Relatively deprived Ugandans—those whose economic positions are in decline—are more likely to incite violence.⁶¹ Land related conflict, such as unequal distribution of land ownership, can exacerbate productivity losses or relative deprivation. This is exemplified by indicators 8-13, which address poverty rates and distribution of opportunities and access across ethnic groups. These indicators help to measure the phenomenon, allowing for targeted

intervention and atrocity prevention efforts.

At the surface level, economic growth within Uganda and dramatic decreases in poverty levels from 56% to almost 20% by 2014 suggest that the likelihood of economic drivers is decreasing.⁶² However, economic inequality in Uganda has increased, to the point where the richest 10% of the population receives 30% of the national income, while the poorest 10% receives less than 3%. Poverty reduction has been asymmetrical, where urban-rural divides highlight failed development strategies and government policies. Oxfam reports that while 9.3% of the urban population lives below the poverty line, this number more than doubles in rural areas.⁶³ Following this trend, poverty levels in the North and Northeastern regions of Uganda remain well above national averages, with Northern Uganda also being labeled “the most food-insecure region.”⁶⁴

Recent development of infrastructure projects in northern and western oil-rich areas highlight the plan to capitalize on natural endowments to industrialize. However, 72% of the population is currently employed within the agriculture sector. Training for a transition to a proto-industrial state is lacking and youth populations are particularly unprepared for this new transition.⁶⁵

Access to education reflects low opportunities for societal mobilization and stratification based on

59 Tom Ogwang, Frank Vanclay, Arjan van den Assem, "Rent-Seeking Practices, Local Resource Curse, and Social Conflict in Uganda's Emerging Oil Economy," <https://www.mdpi.com/2073-445X/8/4/53/htm>.

60 Olingo, Allan, "Uganda signs \$4bn refinery plant deal," April 2018, <https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/business/Uganda-signs-USD4bn-refinery-plant-deal--/2560-4393822-oyqk9rz/index.html>

61 Ted R. Gurr, "Relative deprivation and the impetus to violence," in *Why Men Rebel* (1970): 22-58.

62 World Bank, "The Uganda Poverty Assessment Report 2016," The World Bank, September 2016, accessed March 30, 2019, <http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/381951474255092375/pdf/Uganda-Poverty-Assessment-Report-2016.pdf>

63 Augustus Nuwagaba and Fred Muhumuza, "Who Is Growing? Ending Inequality in Uganda," Oxfam, March 29, 2017, https://www-cdn.oxfam.org/s3fs-public/file_attachments/oxfam_in_uganda_inequality_report_compressed.pdf.

64 Augustus Nuwagaba and Fred Muhumuza, "Who Is Growing? Ending Inequality in Uganda," Oxfam, March 29, 2017, https://www-cdn.oxfam.org/s3fs-public/file_attachments/oxfam_in_uganda_inequality_report_compressed.pdf.

65 Alexandra Löwe and Sanyu Phiona, "Creating Opportunities for Young People in Northern Uganda's Agriculture Sector," ODI, July 2017, <https://www.odi.org/publications/10865-creating-opportunities-young-people-northern-uganda-s-agriculture-sector>.

gender.⁶⁶ West Nile, Acholiland, and Karamoja have the highest percentages of children ten or older who have never been to school. In a sectorial shift toward technology and manufacturing, an uneducated workforce has fewer employment opportunities, which can increase youth frustration. Lack of skill development and job training exacerbate market access opportunities. Additionally, centralization and urban-rural divides lead to increased feelings of relative deprivation. Indicator 16 proposes monitoring of education, including who is enrolled and who is graduating, recognizing the importance of education and an equitable access to opportunity as mitigating factors for mass atrocity prevention.

Structural inequalities and reliance on agriculture is further complicated by a complex land tenure system within Uganda and increasing environmental drivers. Land—particularly arable land—is a valued resource, which a massive youth population has made an even more important commodity. Furthermore, 96% of Uganda’s farmers are considered “smallholders,” owning five acres of land or fewer.⁶⁷ The potential for tenure claims—made based on Mailo (Buganda’s land tenure system), freehold, and leasehold—and inheritance claims contribute to violence by the absence of reliable, institutionalized dispute resolution mechanisms. An unreliable legal system offers diminished accountability for landlords who frequently sell land without consulting with tenants on whether they want to purchase the land, per Land Act regulations.⁶⁸ The Vegetable Oil Development Project, which

was introduced by the Ugandan government and has been supported by international funding, has been part of a larger trend of land grabbing, leading to evictions in areas where few rural residents have official land titles for the lands they live on. The “grabbed” land is being used to produce cash crops like coffee, sugarcane, palm oil, rice, and sunflower. Fear of eviction prevents residents from constructing permanent residences or implementing long-term planting plants.⁶⁹ With the increasing value of land, and without proper dispute resolution mechanisms or protections, the land tenure system complicates the relationship between Ugandans and the land, and creates systems of fear, frustration, distrust, and anger. Social identity in Uganda has been crucial in defining intergroup relationships at the local, regional, and national levels. As with many other post-colonial African countries, the ethnic identities of Ugandans have been codified through the creation of political and national institutions, with many ethnic identities creating strong in- and out-groups.

SOCIAL IDENTITY

Forty million Ugandans are divided between 50 ethnic groups, largely along a north-south divide. The population can generally be divided into the Bantu-speaking people in the south (e.g. Baganda and Basoga); the Nilo-Hamites (e.g. Iteso and Karimojong) in the east and northeast; the Nilotics (e.g. Acholi and Alur) in the central north; and the Sudanic (e.g. the Lugbara and Kakwa), in the northwest (Lapwoch and P’Olak).⁷⁰

66 Clint Borgen, “What Is Impacting Girls’ Education in Uganda,” The Borgen Project, June 22, 2018, <https://borgen-project.org/girls-education-in-uganda/>.

67 Jaime Anderson, Colleen Leach, and Scott Gardner, “National Survey and Segmentation of Smallholder Households in Uganda,” World Bank, April 2016, <http://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/2574/download/42008>.

68 Simon Coldham, “Land Reform and Customary Rights: The Case of Uganda,” *Journal of African Law* 44, no. 1 (2000): 65–77.

69 Chris Lang, “Ugandan Farmers Kicked off Their Land for New Forests Company’s Carbon Project,” *REDD Monitor*, September 23, 2011, <https://redd-monitor.org/2011/09/23/ugandan-farmers-kicked-off-their-land-for-new-forests-companys-carbon-project/>.

70 University of Pennsylvania, “Uganda Ethnic Groups,” accessed May 5, 2019, <https://www.africa.upenn.edu/NE->

Political groups and militias in Uganda may exploit identity, ethnic, and religious wedges, and leverage a history of conflict to violence. Social identity drivers, particularly in the Acholi region, can feed into loops of violence; thus, these identities play a large role in potential conflicts within the region.

The war between Joseph Kony's LRA and President Museveni's NRM focused on ethnic identity and religious ideology. A history of identity-based conflict is an important pressure point for violence in the future. As mentioned earlier, feedback loops with social identity conflict drivers need to be examined, especially in relation to the repeat cycles of conflict, which can be clearly observed as in the case of Uganda.

LEGAL PROCESSES TRANSNATIONAL PEACE PROCESS

Immediately after the NRM established its administration, it began a policy of decentralization, transferring authority to local council courts (LCCs) with the intention of returning "power to the people."⁷¹ The move also sought to increase government accountability and foster greater civil participation in decision making processes. The decentralization policy reintroduced LCCs under the belief that justice would be more accessible to Ugandans and allow for a return to "customary traditions." Each ethnic group in Uganda therefore has a separate justice system. The legal system allows people to take civil complaints relating to customary law either to the formal court systems or to customary tribunals. Customary tribunals, conducted in local languages, are intended to

reduce the formality of traditional court systems and reduce costs of legal claims by disallowing attorneys.⁷²

Customary tribunals are intended to provide improved dispute resolution but have magnified structural violence threats. Formal court costs, including attorneys and transportation costs, discourage impoverished people from pursuing justice through these channels, even before accounting for corruption costs, such as bribing an official (indicator 22). Reliance on witness testimonies within the formal court system introduces an entirely different expense and given the ability for wealthy defendants to pay off witnesses, the cost of transporting them may not be enough to guarantee a fair trial outcome.⁷³

The volume of LCCs guarantees the appropriate body within the central government, with its current resources, cannot provide appropriate oversight. Thus, the potential for corruption, and by extension the potential for exclusion from these processes, dramatically increases. Because LCC officers are not barred from, and frequently do sit on, customary tribunals, power dynamics that prevent marginalized groups from seeking justice are preserved and the capability of the tribunal to remain impartial may diminish. Furthermore, because of the lack of supervision over the LCCs, and because of the frequency by which LCCs have become entwined with customary tribunals, the opportunity to uphold customary laws over constitutionally guaranteed rights often occurs when it benefits those in positions of relative power.

H/u-ethn.html.

71 Surf Report, "Legal Framework for Local Council Courts," accessed May 5, 2019, <https://lawcomm.pepperdine.edu/legal-framework-for-local-council-courts/>.

72 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, "Traditional Authorities and Customary Institutions | Gender and Land Rights Database," accessed May 5, 2019, http://www.fao.org/gender-landrights-database/country-profiles/countries-list/customary-law/traditional-authorities-and-customary-institutions/en/?country_iso3=UGA.

73 Brenda Mahoro, "Uganda's Legal System and Legal Sector," March 2013, <https://www.mcgeorge.edu/Documents/sampleCasesHistoryUganda.pdf>.

Women and youth are at most risk for being excluded or provided unequal access to the LCCs, most apparent in land tenure disputes and when they fall victim to land-grabbing; in such cases, traditional formal justice systems have not protected women's rights, especially in cases where customary claims are not being made.⁷⁴ These failures have ensured that women hold little faith in the ability of justice systems, informal or otherwise, to protect them. Contributing to this are the insufficient penalties for criminal behaviors like land grabbing. Widows are one of the most vulnerable groups to land grabbing, in part because they often lack in-depth knowledge of their legal rights, with a survey indicating 54.5% of widows did not report land-grabbing because they did not realize it was a criminal act.⁷⁵ Confusion stems from the fact that the perpetrators of land grabbing are often family and community members. Even in cases where they do understand their rights, lack of faith in the system may be enough to deter them.⁷⁶ Where land has not yet been grabbed, the process for administering a deceased spouse's estate is expensive and vastly overwhelming. Consequently, women lose land, an invaluable resource for providing for their family and making a living. When women lack the same number of opportunities as men, their children are also affected (indicators 16 and 17).


Ugandan legal systems are structural drivers of conflict, particularly in its impact on the youth population (indicator 15). Lack of faith in local governments translates to a lack of faith in the central government and a desire for new

leadership. An inefficient justice system has meant rises in mob violence and vigilante justice. These structural issues inhibit people finding secure income sources, deny them opportunities, and generates frustration and anger (indicator 12). Inefficiency in the justice system and structural violence play into feedback loops, but they also offer potential leverage points for reducing the likelihood of mass atrocity if proper reforms are made and resources allocated.

74 International Justice Mission, "Property Grabbing from Ugandan Widows and the Justice System," accessed May 5, 2019, <https://www.ijm.org/documents/studies/IJM-Property-Grabbing-from-Ugandan-Widows-and-the-Justice-System.pdf>.

75 International Justice Mission, "Property Grabbing from Ugandan Widows and the Justice System," accessed May 5, 2019, <https://www.ijm.org/documents/studies/IJM-Property-Grabbing-from-Ugandan-Widows-and-the-Justice-System.pdf>.

76 International Justice Mission, "Property Grabbing from Ugandan Widows and the Justice System," accessed May 5, 2019, <https://www.ijm.org/documents/studies/IJM-Property-Grabbing-from-Ugandan-Widows-and-the-Justice-System.pdf>.



CHAPTER 5: MAJOR ISSUES

CHAPTER RELEVANT INDICATORS

INDICATOR 14
ANNUAL
UNEMPLOYMENT
RATE AMONG
YOUTH

INDICATOR 15
ANNUAL CRIME
RATE AMONG
YOUTH

INDICATOR 16
ACCESS TO
EDUCATION

INDICATOR 17
PERCENTAGE
OF WOMEN &
MINORITIES IN
DECISION MAKING
& LEGISLATIVE
ROLES

INDICATOR 18
EFFECTIVENESS OF
DDR PROCESSES

INDICATOR 19
PREVALENCE OF
GENDER BASED
VIOLENCE

MAJOR ISSUES

This chapter discusses major issues in Ugandan society including gender, youth, refugees, health care, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration processes (DDR), religion, and psychosocial factors. These issues are heavily interconnected, and this chapter explores the relation between these issues in order to identify mass atrocity risk factors.

GENDER ISSUES

Ugandan women and girls, as well as some men, face significant social and economic discrimination as well as threats of violence, often due to entrenched patriarchal values and cultural norms that lead to gender-based violence, a prevalent feature of mass atrocity crimes as outlined in indicators 17 and 19.

Women and girls face an uphill struggle with regards to access to and control over reproductive health resources, education, and political representation. Socio-cultural norms and harmful traditional practices including gender-based violence, female genital mutilation, teenage pregnancy, and child and forced marriage further perpetuate gender inequality.⁷⁷ The high social tolerance for gender-based and domestic violence, and the accepted inequality between men and women, undermines efforts towards gender equality and women's empowerment and normalizes violence. Inequalities between men and women in Uganda influence education, job opportunities, property rights, and access to health and political participation. Women have less economic opportunity and access, which limits their access to resources, economic freedom, and political power. Enforcement of laws protecting women and girls from violence is lacking leading to human rights issues that silence women's voices perpetuate cycles of domestic violence and normalize gender-based and sexual violence against civilians.

Although the numbers of women in Parliament and local government positions have been on the rise through systems of affirmative action, there are still constraints as it relates to women's political effectiveness within the country (indicator 17). The political value of the new

⁷⁷ The Guardian, "Police Arrest 19 People over FGM Gang Attacks on Women in Uganda," January 24, 2019.

seats implemented have since been eroded due to the undermining of women's political interests. Without the presence of a fundamental democratic system for decision making, women are marginalized and silenced. They are also underrepresented and are still criticized when asserting their rights in front of their male constituents. They are deprived of rights to be leading political candidates in open elections and muted when attempting to introduce ways to close the gendered voting gap.

In looking at the potential for mass violence and the impact on a community, in Northern Uganda, women and girls face several of the issues outlined above like others in urban areas, but this is compounded by their recent history of violent conflict in the areas.⁷⁸ Many of the women in the Northern regions of Uganda continue to face physical and psychosocial issues stemming from the violent conflict during the 1990s and early 2000s.⁷⁹ Many of the women are widows, single mothers, mothers whose children were abducted during the conflict and never returned, domestic abuse survivors, former abductees, and women who have lost limbs or are still living with bullet wounds.⁸⁰ During the conflict, women and girls also experienced sexual violence and torture which continues to take a toll on their physical and psychological health.⁸¹ The stigma

surrounding female survivors, particularly those women who bore children from wartime sexual violence, is significantly and negatively influenced by the overarching patriarchal values of Uganda. Consequently, this population has been more likely to face violence and domestic abuse since the end of the conflict.⁸² The women in Uganda who want to protest peacefully and use nonviolent methods to create change are treated brutally by police, thus creating fear of acting or countering the violent narrative and harmful cultural norms (indicator 4).

LGBTQ ISSUES

Members of the LGBTQ community are likely to face legal and social persecution for their identity. Persons found engaging in acts deemed 'homosexual' face life in prison. In addition to laws criminalizing homosexual acts, it is also illegal for anyone to aid or to hide members of the LGBTQ community—to do so is punishable by up to 7 years in prison.⁸³ It is not illegal to be transgender in Uganda, however the concept is foreign to most, and they are often perceived as homosexual and thus face the same discrimination and persecution. Ugandan society has strict interpretations of masculinity and femininity, and those who go against those interpretations put themselves at risk of social violence. Fear of the erosion of social norms and

78 International Crisis Group, "Northern Uganda: Understanding and Solving the Conflict," April 14, 2004, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/uganda/northern-uganda-understanding-and-solving-conflict>.

79 Uganda Bureau of Statistics, "Uganda Facts and Figures on Gender," issue brief, 2013, https://www.ubos.org/wp-content/uploads/publications/04_2018Uganda_Facts_and_Figures_on_Gender_2013.pdf.

80 Sarita Santoshini, "In Northern Uganda, These Women Move past Insurgency by Baking Cakes," Public Radio International, June 15, 2018, accessed February 12, 2019. <https://www.pri.org/stories/2018-06-15/northern-uganda-these-women-move-past-insurgency-baking-cakes>.

81 Helen Liebling-Kalifani, Ruth Ojiambo-Ochieng, Angela Marshall, Juliet Were-Oguttu, and Seggane Musisi, "Violence against Women in Northern Uganda: The Neglected Health Consequences of War," *Journal of International Women's Studies* 9, no. 3 (2008): 174-92.

82 Teddy Atim, Dyan Mazurana, and Anastasia Marshak, "Women Survivors and Their Children Born of Wartime Sexual Violence in Northern Uganda," *Disasters* 42 (2017), doi:10.1111/disa.12275.

83 United Nations Human Rights, Office of the High Commissioner, "Anti-Homosexuality Law in Uganda Violates Human Rights and Endangers LGBT People," news release, February 24, 2014, <https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=14275&LangID=E>.

threats to fragile masculinity can escalate into scenes of public violence.⁸⁴

YOUTH ISSUES

There are approximately 32 million Youths in Uganda—defined as 15 – 35-year-old males and females—which constitutes 78% of the total population. Of these, 1.2 million are idle or unemployed.⁸⁵ Poverty, unemployment, family disputes, political and religious extremism, violence, and sexual assault among the youth populations contribute to, and are exacerbated by, drug abuse, tribalism, injustice, and unfavorable governance policies (indicator 15). There is a significant link between youth exclusion and violence in fragile states because in situations of armed conflict, combatants who may be committing mass atrocity will most likely be under the age of 20. This exclusion includes weak participation in politics, gender inequalities and socialization, legacy of past violence and other grievances which serve to ignite conflict.

Youth unemployment rose from 44% in 2005-06 to 48% in 2009-10. In Northern Uganda, over 80% of youth are unemployed but have military training. Limited access to and control over key assets like land and resources is an ongoing problem, as measured by indicators 8 and 9. Many youths rely on subsistence agriculture as their only source of livelihood and returns on labor and agriculture are low. Floods and other

disasters also increase food insecurity, which disproportionately affects youth. As a result, many disengaged youth and ex-combatants are jobless and frustrated. Many are stigmatized, and they believe there is no hope for their future, which leads to more engagement in crime, anti-social behavior and insecurity. Indicator 15 explores the correlation between crime rates among youth and mass atrocities.

Perceptions of youth are distorted and conflated with war and hate, dividing communities and fueling conflict. The Advisory Consortium on Conflict Sensitivity (ACCS) reported that the generational gap between the young and the old communities in West Nile is fueling conflict.⁸⁶ Familial authority and social structures are breaking down and the youth are challenging conventional authorities and causing tensions. The participation of women and youth in development interventions and their increased participation in public life were cited in communities in Lango as sources of tensions between generations.⁸⁷ The ability for youth in Uganda to maintain adaptive functioning amidst adversity and uncertainties, depends largely on cultural processes. Prominent in this context is the patriarchal cultural process that permits males to be treated more significantly than females. Though it is viewed that this entrenched cultural practice reflects gender inequality, it helps to build personal qualities such as self-esteem and autonomy, that are integral components of bolstering resilience.⁸⁸ It also bestows upon

84 Marjoke Oosterom, "Gender and Fragile Citizenship in Uganda: The Case of Acholi Women," *Gender & Development* 19, no. 3 (November 1, 2011): 395–408, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13552074.2011.625650>.

85 Betty Amamukirori and Apollo Mubiru, "1.2million Ugandan Youth Idle- Population Report," www.newvision.co.ug, accessed May 5, 2019, http://www.newvision.co.ug/new_vision/news/1488782/12million-ugandan-youth-idle-population-report.

86 Monica Llamazares, "Northern Uganda Conflict Analysis: Advisory Consortium on Conflict Sensitivity (ACCS)," Saferworld, London (2013).

87 Monica Llamazares, "Northern Uganda Conflict Analysis: Advisory Consortium on Conflict Sensitivity (ACCS)," Saferworld, London (2013)

88 Sophie Namy et al., "Gender, Violence and Resilience among Ugandan Adolescents," *Child Abuse & Neglect*

them the opportunity to be in a decision-making position in the community, possibly increasing engagement of youth in peacebuilding activities.

Youth also provide a potential mitigating factor in mass atrocity. Social support from schools, peers, and families helps to build resilience among the youth, while also allowing them opportunities to engage constructively in their communities. This involvement in community processes helps to build a more stable political consciousness, which can be a mitigating factor for mass atrocity and armed conflict.

POVERTY AS A SOURCE OF INSTABILITY

Poverty breeds resentment and frustration when coupled with a sense of deliberate marginalization and neglect. It is a commonly held belief that the government deliberately kept the North down, resulting in a greater poverty level.⁸⁹ Indicators 12 and 13 measure the impact of poverty among groups and regions as a driver of mass atrocity.

PSYCHOSOCIAL ISSUES IN UGANDA

Uganda is a society with a high rate of untreated mental illness, left over from the 20-year civil war and prevalence of domestic violence and other forms of trauma. It is estimated that up to

35% of Ugandans suffer from a mental disorder with approximately 15% requiring treatment.⁹⁰ These estimates are suspected to be low due to “international norms, relatively recent high intensity conflicts, and ongoing regional civil unrest.”⁹¹ Possible implications of high rates of untreated mental health issues could be heightened levels of violence, as well as societal trauma which could impact the way in which people react to potential atrocities.

DDR IN UGANDA FORMER LRA COMBATANTS/ABDUCTEES

The war between the Ugandan government and the LRA forced many in Northern Uganda to flee their homes fearing for their safety. In 2005, prior to the beginning of peace talks with the LRA, there were approximately 1.8 million internationally displaced persons (IDP) living in 242 camps.⁹²

Time spent in the bush with the LRA has resulted in many psychological challenges for former combatants and abductees. Some of this can be attributed to the violence that they were forced to perpetrate, negative reinforcement (rewarding basic human needs only when desired behavior is displayed), and punishments they received. They were taught the mentality of kill or be killed, now suffering from trauma related disorders, excessive aggression, and

70 (August 2017): 303–14, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chiabu.2017.06.015>.

89 Helle Harnisch and Anett Pfeiffer, “How ‘The Urge to Kill’ Feels: Articulations of Emic ‘Appetitive Aggression’ Experiences Among Former Forcefully Recruited Children and Youth in the Acholi Region of Northern Uganda,” *Culture, Medicine, and Psychiatry* 42, no. 2 (June 2018): 419–48, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11013-017-9557-4>.

90 Andrew Molodynski, Christina Cusack, and Jurua Nixon, “Mental Healthcare in Uganda: Desperate Challenges but Real Opportunities,” *BJPsych International* 14, no. 4 (November 1, 2017): 98–100.

91 Andrew Molodynski, Christina Cusack, and Jurua Nixon, “Mental Healthcare in Uganda: Desperate Challenges but Real Opportunities,” *BJPsych International* 14, no. 4 (November 1, 2017), 98.

92 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Uganda’s IDP Camps Start to Close as Peace Takes Hold,” UNHCR, accessed April 9, 2019, <https://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2007/9/46e6a68013/ugandas-idp-camps-start-close-peace-takes-hold.html>.

emotional numbness.⁹³ Within communities, former combatants and abductees have faced stigmatization through “Cen” once they returned home. Cen is defined as the “vengeful spirit of a dead person,” a spirit capable of possessing places where killings have been carried out and anyone involved with the killing, including family members to the one who has killed and the one who killed.⁹⁴ Cen is used to stigmatize and name a spectral fear that underlies social relations in postwar northern Uganda due to the extreme intertribal violence that ravaged the region during the two decades-long war.⁹⁵ This phenomenon is referenced in indicator 24, where post-conflict conceptions of certain groups are viewed as an indicator of mass atrocity risk. Under this framework, prejudice and discrimination against certain groups post-conflict should be monitored as a risk factor for potential atrocities. Former LRA members who have lingering mental health issues and military training, could be manipulated into carrying out acts of mass atrocity.

RELIGION

Uganda is predominantly a Christian society

with large Anglican, Evangelical, and Catholic populations.⁹⁶ In many areas, traditional Christianity is integrated with tribal and spiritual beliefs, which can result in friction between groups. A small Muslim population remains mostly in the Buganda region. Tensions continue between Christian and non-Christian populations, with a rising population of extremist groups on the border with DRC (indicator 23). Evangelical missionaries, many coming from the United States, can exacerbate tensions with non-Christian groups, and actively lobby the Ugandan government to enact strict anti-LGBTQ+ laws, as well as limitations on freedom of speech.⁹⁷

EDUCATION IN UGANDA

Within the last 22 years, Uganda has passed several key educational policies like Universal Primary Education (UPE) and Universal Secondary Education (USE).⁹⁸ These two key policies that have been implemented with the intent to address the lack of access to education for economically vulnerable families and to alleviate the high rate of poverty. Despite this, Uganda continues to have one of the highest

93 Helle Harnisch and Anett Pfeiffer, “How ‘The Urge to Kill’ Feels: Articulations of Emic ‘Appetitive Aggression’ Experiences Among Former Forcefully Recruited Children and Youth in the Acholi Region of Northern Uganda,” *Culture, Medicine, and Psychiatry* 42, no. 2 (June 2018): 419–48, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11013-017-9557-4>.

94 Helle Harnisch and Anett Pfeiffer, “How ‘The Urge to Kill’ Feels: Articulations of Emic ‘Appetitive Aggression’ Experiences Among Former Forcefully Recruited Children and Youth in the Acholi Region of Northern Uganda,” *Culture, Medicine, and Psychiatry* 42, no. 2 (June 2018): 419–48, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11013-017-9557-4>.

95 Helle Harnisch and Anett Pfeiffer, “How ‘The Urge to Kill’ Feels: Articulations of Emic ‘Appetitive Aggression’ Experiences Among Former Forcefully Recruited Children and Youth in the Acholi Region of Northern Uganda,” *Culture, Medicine, and Psychiatry* 42, no. 2 (June 2018): 419–48, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11013-017-9557-4>.

96 Global Religious Futures, “Religions in Uganda | PEW-GRF,” http://www.globalreligiousfutures.org/countries/uganda/#/?affiliations_religion_id=0&affiliations_year=2010®ion_name=All%20Countries&restrictions_year=2016.

97 Baptiste, Nathalie, “It’s Not Just Uganda: Behind the Christian Right’s Onslaught in Africa,” April 2014, <https://www.thenation.com/article/its-not-just-uganda-behind-christian-rights-onslaught-africa/>

98 World Bank, “Achieving Universal Primary Education in Uganda: The ‘Big Bang’ Approach,” April 2002, <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/10412/241070BRI0REPL1BLIC10EduNotesUganda.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>.

primary level drop-out rates in the world. It is estimated that 90.2% of enrolled children in primary education do not complete school. Of those that do complete primary education, around 25% will go on to secondary school.⁹⁹ Parental responsibilities, faulty execution of policies, misallocation of funds and corruption, and poverty contribute Uganda's high drop-out rate.¹⁰⁰


The Ministry of Education, Sports Technology and Science (MoESTS) states that there is almost gender parity in provision for primary education: 58% of females and 59% of males have attained some primary education.¹⁰¹ However, these statistics change in regions affected by conflict. In Acholi, for example, 64% of males and only 36% of females have attained some primary education.¹⁰² As outlined in Indicators 14 and 16, equal access to education and gainful employment for the youth population of Uganda across regions, ethnicities, and gender, across regions, ethnicities, and gender is a pivotal indicator for the potential for mass atrocity.

99 Simone Datzberger, "Why Education Is Not Helping the Poor. Findings from Uganda," *World Development* 110 (October 2018): 125–129.

100 Simone Datzberger, "Why Education Is Not Helping the Poor. Findings from Uganda," *World Development* 110 (October 2018): 125–129.

101 Simone Datzberger and Marielle L.J. Le Mat, "Just Add Women and Stir?" *International Journal of Educational Development* 59 (March 2018): 61–69, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijedudev.2017.09.006>.

102 Simone Datzberger and Marielle L.J. Le Mat, "Just Add Women and Stir?" *International Journal of Educational Development* 59 (March 2018): 61–69, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijedudev.2017.09.006>.

The image features a background of an aerial view of a city, showing various buildings and structures. A large, dark green diagonal arrow graphic points from the top-left towards the bottom-right, partially overlapping the city scene. The text is centered within a semi-transparent white rectangular area that also follows the diagonal path of the arrow.

CHAPTER 6: RECOMMENDATIONS

POTENTIAL CONFLICT TRIGGERS

POTENTIAL CONFLICT TRIGGER #1

This report has highlighted the situation in Uganda as dynamic and pivotal to the conversation on mass atrocity prevention in the region. As a result, the following section will evaluate possible situations that are of concern in the coming future with the goal of these recommendations to provide an agenda for relevant stakeholders to consider in order to alleviate the risks of violence which could lead to mass atrocities, and to help set Uganda on a peaceful path.

The 2021 Ugandan presidential election, and the events leading up to the election, should be monitored closely. In the past, the Ugandan government has made it extremely difficult for opposing candidates to run through social media censorship and arresting those that oppose the current president, as illustrated by the current tension around Bobi Wine. Thus, we could see additional government censorship leading up to the elections. If President Museveni were to be re-elected for another term, this could result in antagonized citizens and possible youth mobilization. How the government chooses to respond will be critical to monitor. Based upon the outcome of the elections, this could lead to protests and a violent government response.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

United Nations and International Community:

- Ensuring their presence is there to try and mediate any tensions.
- Provide Election Monitors.

Uganda Government:

- Ensure free and fair elections without censorship.

ICGLR Regional Committee on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity and all forms of Discrimination:

- Provide Election Monitors to supervise the electoral process in local contexts.

NGOs/CSOs:

- Work with local grassroots and grassroots agencies to promote electoral education awareness.
- Work with United Nations to facilitate monitoring and mitigate tensions as necessary.

Grassroots/Grasstops:

- Ensuring that communities are aware of the importance of their vote and know how to vote.
- Holding educational classes with women and minority groups to show them why it is important to vote and how impactful they can be.

POTENTIAL CONFLICT TRIGGER #2

A concern over a possible Arab Spring style revolution led by the youth of Uganda. If this were to begin, the youth would likely mobilize a series of peaceful protests against the oppressive regime in hopes of gaining human rights, democracy and jobs. In Uganda this may go one of two ways. It could work, and the government would respond positively, or we could see the government respond with brutality (e.g. by killing and/or imprisoning protestors). If the government were to respond with brutality, we could potentially see Uganda fall into mass violence. Women and minority ethnic populations would be the most vulnerable if this were to happen.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

United Nations and International Community:

- Defend the rights of Ugandans for peaceful protest and right of assembly.

- Express in unequivocal terms that any violence towards peaceful protests will not be tolerated.
- Threaten the use of sanctions in case the Ugandan government fails to adhere to human rights standards.

Ugandan Government:

- Train police officers in non-violent techniques to deal with protestors and crowds.
- Develop mechanisms that would enable the youth to voice their concerns or grievances.
- Provide the space for peaceful protest.
- Reduce censorship of media.
- Release political prisoners from jail.

ICGLR Regional Committee on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity and all forms of Discrimination:

- Work with regional partners to monitor protests to ensure that Uganda government maintains a peaceful response and respects Ugandans' right to assembly.

NGOs/CSOs:

- Train civil activists in tools to document any violations from the government or police forces.
- Ensure that the protests organized by NGOs remain peaceful, and that the safety of those protesting is protected.
- Work to protect vulnerable populations.
- Develop an agenda for change with concrete policies.

Grassroots/Grass-tops:

- Organize and train protestors in nonviolent techniques.
- Hold meetings with members of their local community to determine areas of frustration and try to address them before they escalate.
- Work with ICGLR, NGOs/CSOs, and the

Ugandan Government to promote dialogue and peaceful production discussions.

POTENTIAL CONFLICT TRIGGER #3

The spread of misinformation about refugees, combined with corruption, reduction and misappropriation of assistance funding have led to tensions between local populations and refugees. A rapid increase in regional deforestation and long lines at local wells is also leading to potential confrontation between these groups. Moreover, as funding from the international community decreases while refugee populations increase, the Ugandan government and local aid agencies are overwhelmed by needs. If refugee flows do not decrease, or the Ugandan government does not change their current system of support, localized violence may erupt and could spread to other regional or cross-border areas.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

United Nations and International Community:

- Boost funding mechanisms for the refugee and local community response.
- Ensure transparency in how funds are appropriated and disbursed by closer monitoring of how funds are used.
- Work with local actors to promote economic development in local areas impacted by refugee inflow.
- Increase local environmental sustainability measures in areas hosting refugee camps.
- Develop and organize programs that promote human rights, rule of law, and good governance. Such programs may include; support for human right defenders, civil society and local institutions.
- Design programs that could address conflict dynamics and reduce conflict drivers.
- Promote civil society, provide support for journalists, lawyers, women and youths organizations and activities. These groups

should generate campaigns that object hate messages and bolster resilience while reducing vulnerability.

- Collaborate with the local population to ensure effective monitoring and early reporting on trends related to mass atrocity.

Ugandan government:

- Work on a media campaign to combat common misconceptions about refugees.
- Ensure local communities are provided the necessary aid and economic support.
- Support grassroot and community level initiatives to pursue dialogue between refugees and the local population.

ICGLR Regional Committee on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity and all forms of Discrimination:

- Initiate regional support measures to decrease refugee flows into Uganda.
- Support the International Community effort to provide aid and improve partnerships between local humanitarian actors and the refugee communities.
- Support the NGO/CSOs providing aid and support dialogue between the local and refugee communities.

NGOs/CSOs:

- Work with the government to create a transparency and information campaign to dispel any misconceptions regarding refugees.
- Work on a dialogue initiative between refugees and local communities to open a line of communication and strengthen their relationship.
- Develop a plan to combat resource competition and move towards renewable practices.
- Coordinate with the government, and international community on economic initiatives to boost local employment and

education.

- Initiate education about sustainable food and energy resources and methods.

Grassroots/Grass-tops:

- Work with local community leaders to engage in sustainable dialogue with the refugee population.
- Work with the local communities to address any frustrations that have arisen due to the refugees and try to provide solutions that do not compromise the basic human needs of the refugees.
- Develop plans to better share natural resources with a mind towards sustainability.

APPENDIX A: CONTEXT-SPECIFIC INDICATORS FOR MASS ATROCITIES IN UGANDA

HUMAN RIGHTS & LIBERTIES

1

The number of individuals arrested as political prisoners (peaceful protests, journalists, and opposition members.)

2

Type of Political Regime.

Measure: Length of presidential rule

Measure: The Polity Score

3

Level of Censorship and Access to Media and Internet

Measure: Number of newspapers running stories on opposition candidates.

Measure: Government controlled radio programming.

Measure: Presence of social media tax.

Measure: Number of websites blocked by the government.

Measure: Internet penetration rate.

4

Ability to hold protests and demonstrations (rights to assembly).

5

Level of Violence against journalists.

Measure: Number of journalists imprisoned or killed.

6

Representation of opposition parties in government.

7

Level of violence against opposition candidates.

RESOURCE ALLOCATION & POVERTY

8

Number of people without access to clean water (National and Regional).

9

Number of Ugandans that experience food insecurity.

10

Regional disparity of agricultural output by commodity [National or by Area].

11

Percentage of the population living in poverty.

12

History of community violence in impoverished areas [By region].

13

Rate of poverty by ethnic group.

OPPORTUNITY & ACCESS

14

Annual unemployment rate among youth (ages 15 to 30).

15

Annual crime rate among youth
(ages 15 to 30).

16

Access to Education.

Measure: Number of students who finish secondary education and access tertiary education.

Measure: Number of students who finish tertiary education.

Measure: Value of public investment spent per student.

Measure: Number of hours students spend in the classroom.

17

Percentage of women and minorities in decision making and legislative roles.

18

Effectiveness of past or current DDR processes.

19

Prevalence of Gender Based Violence.

Measure: Rates of reported domestic violence and sexual assault.

Measure: Harmful cultural attitudes toward women and traditional gender roles that prevent women from peacemaking practices and decision making.

Measure: Rates of violence against LGBTQ+ community.

Measure: Rates of women completing school.

REGIONAL STRESSORS

20

Number of refugees in X area in Y Time.

21

Number of IDP's in X area in Y Time.

22

Corruption Perception.

Source: Transparency International Survey.

23

Number of people killed in armed conflicts in neighboring countries of similar ethnic, religious, and broader identity composition.

24

Perceptions and attitudes of conflict survivors.

25

Rate of Urbanization.

26

Public discourse and attitudes towards minority groups.

Measure: Discourse analysis.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Advisory Consortium on Conflict Sensitivity. "NORTHERN UGANDA CONFLICT ANALYSIS." dokumentis.com. Accessed May 5, 2019. <https://dokumentis.com/northern-uganda-conflict-analysis-advisory-consortium-on-con.html>.
- Alao, Abiodun. *Natural resources and conflict in Africa: the tragedy of endowment*. Vol. 29. University Rochester Press, 2007.
- Amamukirori, Betty, and Apollo Mubiru. "1.2million Ugandan Youth Idle- Population Report." www.newvision.co.ug. Accessed May 5, 2019. http://www.newvision.co.ug/new_vision/news/1488782/12million-ugandan-youth-idle-population-report.
- AMISOM. "African Union Hails Uganda for Its Contribution in Stabilizing Somalia," April 5, 2017. <http://amisom-au.org/2017/04/african-union-hails-uganda-for-its-contribution-in-stabilizing-somalia/>.
- Anderson, David M., and Jacob McKnight. "Understanding al-Shabaab: clan, Islam and insurgency in Kenya." *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 9, no. 3 (2015): 536-557.
- Anderson, Jaime, Colleen Leach, and Scott Gardner. "National Survey and Segmentation of Small holder Households in Uganda." World Bank, April 2016. <http://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/2574/download/42008>.
- Al Jazeera. "WHO: Deadly plague breaks out on Uganda-Congo border." March 14, 2019. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/03/deadly-plague-breaks-uganda-congo-border-190314075949596.html>.
- Ashaba, Ivan M. and Gerald Berebe. "Closed borders and fighting words: Rwanda and Uganda's deepening rift." *African Arguments*, March 12, 2019. <https://africanarguments.org/2019/03/12/closed-border-fighting-words-rwanda-uganda-rift/>.
- Baptiste, Nathalie. "It's Not Just Uganda: Behind the Christian Right's Onslaught in Africa." *The Nation*. April 4, 2014. <https://www.thenation.com/article/its-not-just-uganda-behind-christian-rights-onslaught-africa/>.
- Bategeka, Lawrence, and Nathan Okurut. "Universal primary education: Uganda." Policy brief 10 Bauer, Isabella. "Uganda's hidden role in Congo's conflict." *DW*. January 4, 2019. <https://www.dw.com/en/ugandas-hidden-role-in-congos-conflict/a-16494434>.

- Bauer, Isabella. "Uganda's hidden role in Congo's conflict." DW. January 4, 2019. <https://www.dw.com/en/ugandas-hidden-role-in-congos-conflict/a-16494434>.
- BBC. "Sudan Military Coup Topples Bashir," April 11, 2019, sec. Africa. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-47891470>.
- Bearak, Max. "Uganda breached arms embargo in funneling European weapons to South Sudan, report says." The Washington Post. November 29, 2019. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2018/11/29/uganda-funneled-european-weapons-south-sudan-breaching-arms-embargo-report/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.1f88f225d005.
- Bellamy, Alex J. Mass atrocities and armed conflict: Links, distinctions, and implications for the responsibility to prevent. Muscatine, IA: Stanley Foundation, 2011.
- Biryabarema, Elias. "At Least 22 Killed in Post-Election Violence in Uganda's West: Police." Reuters, March 14, 2016. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-uganda-security-idUSKCN0WG1G4>.
- Bøås, Morten. African Conflicts and Conflicts Drivers: Uganda, Congo and the Mano River. Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2008.
- Borgen, Clint. "What Is Impacting Girls' Education in Uganda." The Borgen Project, June 22, 2018. <https://borgenproject.org/girls-education-in-uganda/>.
- Borzello, Anna. "The challenge of DDR in Northern Uganda: The Lord's resistance army." In Reintegrating Armed Groups After Conflict, pp. 158-185. Routledge, 2009.
- Brinkhoff, Thomas. "Uganda: Administrative Division (Regions and Districts) - Population Statistics, Charts and Map." Uganda: Regions and Districts, 2019. <https://www.citypopulation.de/php/uganda-admin.php>.
- Church, Cheyanne, and Mark M. Rogers. Designing for results: Integrating monitoring and evaluation in conflict transformation programs. Search for Common Ground, 2006.
- Clark, Phil. "Bringing them all back home: the challenges of DDR and transitional justice in contexts of displacement in Rwanda and Uganda." Journal of Refugee Studies 27, no. 2 (2014): 234-259.
- Coldham, Simon. "Land Reform and Customary Rights: The Case of Uganda." Journal of African Law 44, no. 1 (2000): 65-77.
- Collier, Paul, Anke Hoeffler, and Dominic Rohner. "Beyond greed and grievance: feasibility and civil war." Oxford Economic papers 61, no. 1 (2009): 1-27.

- Cooper, Sara, Joshua Ssebunnya, Fred Kigozi, Crick Lund, Alan Flisher, and MHaPP Research Programme Consortium. "Viewing Uganda's mental health system through a human rights lens." *International Review of Psychiatry* 22, no. 6 (2010): 578-588.
- Clark, Phil. "Bringing them all back home: the challenges of DDR and transitional justice in contexts of displacement in Rwanda and Uganda." *Journal of Refugee Studies* 27, no. 2 (2014): 234-259.
- Coldham, Simon. "Land Reform and Customary Rights: The Case of Uganda." *Journal of African Law* 44, no. 1 (2000): 65-77.
- Collier, Paul, Anke Hoeffler, and Dominic Rohner. "Beyond greed and grievance: feasibility and civil war." *Oxford Economic papers* 61, no. 1 (2009): 1-27.
- Cooper, Sara, Joshua Ssebunnya, Fred Kigozi, Crick Lund, Alan Flisher, and MHaPP Research Programme Consortium. "Viewing Uganda's mental health system through a human rights lens." *International Review of Psychiatry* 22, no. 6 (2010): 578-588.
- Council on Foreign Relations. "Civil War in South Sudan." *Global Conflict Tracker*. Accessed May 5, 2019. <https://cfr.org/interactive/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/civilwar-south-sudan>.
- Daily Monitor. "Buganda Roots for Women Rights at World Bank Conference In." March 29, 2019. <https://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/Buganda-roots-women-rights-World-Bank-conference-Washington-DC/688334-5047928-vsbnvz/index.html>.
- Daily Monitor. "I Am Still a Prisoner, Says King Mumbere." May 27, 2017. <https://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/Still-prisoner-king-Mumbere-Rwenzururu/688334-3943400-x5sg63z/index.html>.
- Daily Monitor. "What Has Universal Secondary Education Achieved in Uganda?" June 29, 2018. <https://www.monitor.co.ug/OpEd/Commentary/Universal-Secondary-Education-Uganda-private-schools/689364-4637320-3vx1mm/index.html>
- Datzberger, Simone, and Marielle L.J. Le Mat. "Just Add Women and Stir?" *International Journal of Educational Development* 59 (March 2018): 61-69. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijedudev.2017.09.006>.
- Datzberger, Simone. "Why Education Is Not Helping the Poor. Findings from Uganda." *World Development* 110 (October 2018): 124-39.
- Deininger, Klaus, and Raffaella Castagnini. "Incidence and impact of land conflict in Uganda." *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization* 60, no. 3 (2006): 321-345.

- Department of State. Bureau of Counter-Terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism Country Report 2016. (2017)
- Doctors Without Borders, APO Group. "Conflict and Displacement in DRC Fuel an Acute Humanitarian Emergency in Uganda." Africa Newsroom. March 2, 2018.
- Dupuy, Lisa and Klaas van Dijken. "Investigating DR Congo's illegal gold trade." DW. January 8, 2019. <https://www.dw.com/en/investigating-dr-congos-illegal-gold-trade/a-46997332>.
- EAC. "EALA Begins Sensitization of Stakeholders in Region." February 1, 2019. <https://www.eac.int/press-releases/1344-eala-begins-sensitization-of-stakeholders-in-region>.
- Eastern and Southern African Anti-Money Laundering Group: Anti-Money Laundering Counter Terrorist Financing – Uganda. September 2018. <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/fur/ESAAMLG-FUR-Uganda-2018.pdf>
- Esteban, Joan, Massimo Morelli, and Dominic Rohner. "Strategic mass killings." *Journal of Political Economy* 123, no. 5 (2015): 1087-1132.
- Findley, Michael G., and Josiah F. Marineau. "Lootable resources and third-party intervention into civil wars." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 32, no. 5 (2015): 465-486.
- Firchow, Pamina. *Reclaiming everyday peace: local voices in measurement and evaluation after war*. Cambridge University Press, 2018.
- Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. "Traditional Authorities and Customary Institutions | Gender and Land Rights Database." Accessed May 5, 2019. http://www.fao.org/gender-landrights-database/country-profiles/countries-listcustomary-law/traditional-authorities-and-customary-institutions/en/?country_iso3=UGA.
- Galtung, Johan. "Cultural violence." *Journal of peace research* 27, no. 3 (1990): 291-305.
- Galtung, Johan. "Violence, peace, and peace research." *Journal of peace research* 6, no. 3 (1969): 167-191.
- Galtung, Johan. *Environment, development, and military activity: Towards alternative security doctrines*. Universitetsforlaget, 1982.
- Global Religious Futures. "Religions in Uganda | PEW-GRF." Accessed February 6, 2019. http://www.globalreligiousfutures.org/countries/uganda#/?affiliations_religion_id=0&affiliations_year=2010®ion_name=All%20Countries&restrictions_year=2016.
- Goldstein, Joseph. "As Rich Nations Close the Door on Refugees, Uganda Welcomes Them." *The New York Times*, October 29, 2018, sec. World. <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/28/world/africa/uganda-refugees.html>.

- Gurr, Ted Robert. "Relative deprivation and the impetus to violence." In *Why Men Rebel* (1970): 22-58.
- Harakat Ul-Mujahidin (HuM) | Terrorist Groups | TRAC. "Twelve Ugandans Detained in Manica on Suspicion of Connection with Suspected Ahlu Sunnah Wa-Jamo/Ansar Al-Sunna (Shabaab) Attacks in Cabo Delgado (Mozambique) - 12 February 2019." Accessed February 14, 2019. <https://www.trackingterrorism.org/chat/twelve-ugandans-detained-manica-suspicion-connection-suspected-ahlu-sunnah-wa-jamoansar-al-s>.
- Harnisch, Helle, and Anett Pfeiffer. "How 'The Urge to Kill' Feels: Articulations of Emic 'Appetitive Aggression' Experiences Among Former Forcefully Recruited Children and Youth in the Acholi Region of Northern Uganda." *Culture, medicine, and psychiatry* 42, no. 2 (2018): 419-448.
- Haroz, Emily E., Laura K. Murray, Paul Bolton, Theresa Betancourt, and Judith K. Bass. "Adolescent resilience in Northern Uganda: The role of social support and prosocial behavior in reducing mental health problems." *Journal of Research on Adolescence* 23, no. 1 (2013): 138-148.
- Høivik, Tord. "The demography of structural violence." *Journal of Peace Research* 14, no. 1 (1977): 59-73.
- Homer-Dixon, Thomas F. "Environmental scarcities and violent conflict: evidence from cases." *International security* 19, no. 1 (1994): 5-40.
- Homer-Dixon, Thomas F. "On the threshold: environmental changes as causes of acute conflict." *International security* 16, no. 2 (1991): 76-116.
- HRW. "Uganda: Free Pass on High-Level Corruption." Human Rights Watch, October 21, 2013. <https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/10/21/uganda-free-pass-high-level-corruption>.
- HRW. "Uganda: Violence, Reprisals in Western Region." Human Rights Watch, November 5, 2014. <https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/11/05/uganda-violence-reprisals-western-region>.
- Huylebroeck, Lisa, and Kristof Titeca. "Universal Secondary Education (USE) in Uganda: blessing or curse? The impact of USE on educational attainment and performance." In *L'Afrique des grands lacs: annuaire 2014-2015*/Reyntjens, F.[edit.]; et al., pp. 349-372. 2015.
- Iazzolino, Gianluca, and Mohamed Hersi. "Shelter from the storm: Somali migrant networks in Uganda between international business and regional geopolitics." *Journal of Eastern African Studies* (2019): 1-18.

ICGLR. "International Conference on Peace, Security, Democracy and Development in the Great Lakes Region," November 19, 2004. http://www.icglr.org/images/Dar_Es_Sa_laam_Declaration_on_Peace_Security_Democracy_and_Development.pdf.

ICGLR. "RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE ICGLR COMMITTEE ON GENOCIDE PREVENTION TO THE RIMC DURING THE SUMMIT IN DECEMBER, 2011," December 2011. <http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/Zanzibarpdf.pdf>.

ICGLR. "Genocide Prevention." Accessed May 5, 2019. <http://www.icglr.org/index.php/en/genocide-prevention>.

ICTJ. Retrieved from <https://www.ictj.org/our-work/regions-and-countries/uganda>.

Inclusive Security. Accessed <https://www.inclusivesecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Why-Women-Report-2017.pdf>.

International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, "Crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo," <http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/crisis-in-drc#rebel>

International Rescue Committee. Uganda: Citizen's perceptions on Refugees. June 19, 2018. <https://www.rescue.org/sites/default/files/document/2858/ircuganda.pdf>.

Iversen Kirstine Anne (2009) Transitional Justice in Northern Uganda. A report on the pursuit of justice in ongoing conflict. October 30, 2009.

Institute for Security Studies. "How Uganda and UNHCR Failed Refugees - Uganda." Relief Web. Accessed May 5, 2019. <https://reliefweb.int/report/uganda/how-uganda-and-unhcr-failed-refugees>.

International Court of Justice. "Latest Developments | Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda) | International Court of Justice." Accessed May 5, 2019. <https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/116>.

International Criminal Court. "Situation in Uganda." Accessed May 5, 2019. <https://www.icc-cpi.int/uganda>.

International Justice Mission. "Property Grabbing from Ugandan Widows and the Justice System." Accessed May 5, 2019. <https://www.ijm.org/documents/studies/IJM-Property-Grabbing-from-Ugandan-Widows-and-the-Justice-System.pdf>.

IOL. "Uganda Announces Oil Discovery," October 2006. <https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/uganda-announces-oil-discovery-296822>.

- Kagenda, Patrick. "Behind the attacks in western Uganda." Retrieved on January 3 (2014): 2015.
- Kaggwa, Kavuma. "Buganda and EAC Political Federation." *The Independent Uganda*: (blog), April 11, 2019. <https://www.independent.co.ug/buganda-and-eac-political-federation/>.
- Kampala Post. "Uganda-Rwanda Border Closure: Rwandan Citizens Demand Answers from President Kagame." April 3, 2019. <https://kampalapost.com/content/news/uganda-rwanda-border-closure-rwandan-citizens-demand-answers-president-kagame>.
- Karstad, Ingebjorg. "Fleeing DRC to Uganda: Africa's Other Refugee Crisis." *Al Jazeera*. March 01, 2018. Accessed April 22, 2019. <https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/inpictures/fleeing-drc-uganda-africa-refugee-crisis-180301084715204.html>.
- Katusabe, Ruth, Felix Basiima, and Risdell Kasasira. "10 Arrested as Tooro Youth, Police Clash." *Daily Monitor*, June 17, 2014. <https://mobile.monitor.co.ug/News/Toro-youth-fault-Museveni-over-remarks-on-King-Oyo/2466686-2350734-format-xhtml-a6k4od/index.html>.
- Kazoora, C. and Anywar, J., *Mainstreaming Environment and Natural Resources in Justice Law and Order Sector*. Sustainable Development Centre Kampala (2004).
- Keizire, Boaz B. and Onesmus Mugenyi. *Mainstreaming Environment and Natural Resource Issues in Selected Government Sectors- Status, Considerations and Recommendations*, ACODE Policy Research Series, No. 21, 2006. Accessed at http://www.unpei.org/sites/default/files/e_library_documents/UG-Mainstreaming-Env-Natural-Res.pdf
- Kigali, Walter and Catherine Wachiaya. "Refugees flee fresh fighting in Congo to Uganda." *UNHCR*, February 13, 2018. <https://www.unhcr.org/news/stories/2018/2/5a81779e4/refugees-flee-fresh-fighting-congo-uganda.html>.
- Kingma, Kees. 1997. "Demobilization of Combatants after Civil Wars in Africa and Their Reintegration into Civilian Life." *Policy Sciences* 30 (3): 151–65. <https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004215705156>.
- Kron, Josh. "Somalis Rediscover Fear in Haven in Uganda." *The New York Times*. July 21, 2010. Accessed April 22, 2019. <https://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/22/world/africa/22uganda.html>.
- Kustenbauder, Matthew. 2010. *Northern Uganda: Protracted Conflict and Structures of Violence*. Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press. <https://dash.harvard.edu/handle/1/5128469>.

- Kwiringira, Japheth Nkiriyehe, Marion Mugisha Mutabazi, Firminus Mugumya, Edward Kaweesi, Deogratias Munube, and Joseph Rujumba. "Experiences of Gender Based Violence Among Refugee Populations in Uganda: Evidence from Four Refugee Camps." *Eastern Africa Social Science Research Review* 34, no. 1 (January 2018): 291–311. <https://doi.org/10.1353/eas.2018.0010>.
- Lang, Chris. "Ugandan Farmers Kicked off Their Land for New Forests Company's Carbon Project." *REDD Monitor*, September 23, 2011. <https://redd-monitor.org/2011/09/23/ugandan-farmers-kicked-off-their-land-for-new-forests-companys-carbon-project/>.
- Lapwoch, Grace and Kennedy Amone-P'Olak. *Understanding Peace and Conflict through Social Identity Theory. Social Identity and Conflict in Northern Uganda*, Pages 185-198. Retrieved from https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2F978-3-319-29869-6_12.pdf
- Llamazares, Monica. "Northern Uganda Conflict Analysis: Advisory Consortium on Conflict Sensitivity (ACCS)." *Saferworld*. London (2013).
- Löwe, Alexandra, and Sanyu Phiona. "Creating Opportunities for Young People in Northern Uganda's Agriculture Sector." ODI, July 2017. <https://www.odi.org/publications/10865-creating-opportunities-young-people-northern-uganda-s-agriculture-sector>.
- LSE. "Troubling Times for the Rwenzururu Kingdom in Western Uganda." *Africa at LSE* (blog), August 29, 2018. <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2018/08/29/troubling-times-for-the-rwenzururu-kingdom-in-western-uganda/>.
- Mahoro, Brenda. "Uganda's Legal System and Legal Sector," March 2013. <https://www.mcgeorge.edu/Documents/sampleCasesHistoryUganda.pdf>.
- Martiny, Sarah E., and Mark Rubin. "Towards a clearer understanding of social identity theory's self-esteem hypothesis." In *Understanding Peace and Conflict Through Social Identity Theory*, pp. 19-32. Springer, Cham, 2016.
- Molodynski, Andrew, Christina Cusack, and Jurua Nixon. "Mental healthcare in Uganda: desperate challenges but real opportunities." *BJPsych international* 14, no. 4 (2017): 98-100.
- Morris, H. F. "The Uganda Constitution, April 1966." *Journal of African Law* 10, no. 2 (1966): 112–17.
- Mubiru, D. N. "Climate change and adaptation options in Karamoja." *Organ: Food Agric* (2010).

- Mugisha, James, Joshua Ssebunnya, and Fred N. Kigozi. "Towards understanding governance issues in integration of mental health into primary health care in Uganda." *International journal of mental health systems* 10, no. 1 (2016): 25.
- Mukholi, David. *A Complete Guide to Uganda's Fourth Constitution: History, Politics, and the Law*. Kampala, Uganda: Fountain Publishers, 1995.
- Namatovu, Rebecca, Samuel Dawa, Adeyinka Adewale, and Fiona Mulira. "Religious Beliefs and Entrepreneurial Behaviors in Africa: A Case Study of the Informal Sector in Uganda." *Africa Journal of Management* 4, no. 3 (July 3, 2018): 259–81. <https://doi.org/10.1080/23322373.2018.1516939>.
- Namy, Sophie, Catherine Carlson, Andrea Norcini Pala, Devin Faris, Louise Knight, Elizabeth Allen, Karen Devries, and Dipak Naker. "Gender, violence and resilience among Ugandan adolescents." *Child abuse & neglect* 70 (2017): 303-314.
- New York Times. "Rebels Drive More Than 60,000 From Congo to Uganda." 14 July 2013. Accessed July 15, 2013.
- Newvision. "Rwenzururu Kingdom, Government in Talks." Accessed April 22, 2019. http://www.newvision.co.ug/new_vision/news/1490682/-rwenzururu-kingdom-government-talks.
- North, Robert C., and Nazli Choucri. "Economic and political factors in international conflict and integration." *International Studies Quarterly* 27, no. 4 (1983): 443-461.
- Northern Uganda Peace Process: The Need to Maintain Momentum: <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/uganda/northern-uganda-peace-process-need-maintain-momentum>
- "Northern Uganda: Understanding and Solving the Conflict." Crisis Group, April 14, 2004. <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/uganda/northern-uganda-understanding-and-solving-conflict>.
- Ntale, Samson, and David McKenzie. "Ugandan Popstar and Opposition Politician Bobi Wine Jailed." CNN. Accessed May 5, 2019. <https://www.cnn.com/2019/04/29/africa/ugandan-bobi-wine-arrested-intl/index.html>.
- NTV Uganda. UMEME Invests 10 Million Dollars in Western Uganda, 2018. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E667BTIfOpw>.
- Nuwagaba, Augustus, and Fred Muhumuza. "Who Is Growing? Ending Inequality in Uganda." Oxfam, March 29, 2017. https://www-cdn.oxfam.org/s3fs-public/file_attachments/oxfam_in_uganda_inequality_report_compressed.pdf.

- Nyeko, Oryem. "Two Years Later, No Answers on Uganda Killings." Human Rights Watch, November 27, 2018. <https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/11/27/two-years-later-no-answers-uganda-killings>.
- Office of the Press Secretary. "Remarks by the President at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum." Press release (April 23, 2012).
- Ogora, Lino Owor. "Uganda's Ambiguous Relationship with the ICC Amidst Ongwen's Trial." International Justice Monitor, December 11, 2017. <https://www.ijmonitor.org/2017/12/ugandas-ambiguous-relationship-with-the-icc-amidst-ongwens-trial/>.
- O'Grady, Siobahn. "'The Orders Were Clear to Brutalize Me.' Ugandan Pop Star Turned Opposition Politician Says He Was Tortured by Soldiers." Washington Post, September 6, 2018. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2018/09/06/orders-were-clear-brutalize-me-ugandan-pop-star-turned-opposition-politician-says-he-was-tortured-by-soldiers/>.
- Okinor, Samuel. Ethnic tensions rise in Uganda as World Cup row leaves four refugees dead. The Guardian. June 21, 2018. <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2018/jun/21/ethnic-tensions-rise-in-uganda-as-world-cup-row-leaves-four-refugees-dead><https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2018/jun/21/ethnic-tensions-rise-in-uganda-as-world-cup-row-leaves-four-refugees-dead>
- Okiror, Samuel. Massive deforestation by refugees in Uganda sparks clashes with local people. The Guardian. February 18, 2019. <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2019/feb/18/massive-deforestation-by-refugees-in-uganda-sparks-clashes-with-local-people>
- Okurut, Jeje Moses. "Examining the Effect of Automatic Promotion on Students' Learning Achievements in Uganda's Primary Education." World Journal of Education 5, no. 5 (October 11, 2015): 85–100. <https://doi.org/10.5430/wje.v5n5p85>.
- Olingo, Allan. "Uganda signs \$4bn refinery plant deal," April 14, 2018. The East African. <https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/business/Uganda-signs-USD4bn-refinery-plant-deal-/2560-4393822-oyqk9rz/index.html>
- Oneko, Sella. "Rwanda and Uganda – neighbors at loggerheads." DW. March 6, 2019. <https://www.dw.com/en/rwanda-and-uganda-neighbors-at-loggerheads/a-47793883>.
- Oosterom, Marjoke. "Gender and Fragile Citizenship in Uganda: The Case of Acholi Women." Gender & Development 19, no. 3 (November 1, 2011): 395–408. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13552074.2011.625650>.

- Paardekooper, B., J. T. V. M. De Jong, and J. M. A. Hermans. "The Psychological Impact of War and the Refugee Situation on South Sudanese Children in Refugee Camps in Northern Uganda: An Exploratory Study." *Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry* 40, no. 4 (1999): 529–36. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1469-7610.00471>.
- Parker, Ben. Audit finds UN refugee agency critically mismanaged donor funds in Uganda. IRIN News. November 28, 2018. <https://www.irinnews.org/news/2018/11/28/audit-finds-un-refugee-agency-critically-mismanaged-donor-funds-uganda>.
- Patterson, Amy S. "Why are Ugandan Youths so angry? These 4 Takeaways Illuminate Recent Protests." *Washington Post*, September 20, 2018. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/09/20/why-are-ugandan-youth-so-angry-these-4-takeaways-illuminate-the-recent-protests/?utm_term=.01adc0e496cc.
- Pham, Phuong N., Patrick Vinck, and Eric Stover. "Returning Home: Forced Conscription, Reintegration, and Mental Health Status of Former Abductees of the Lord's Resistance Army in Northern Uganda." *BMC Psychiatry* 9, no. 1 (May 16, 2009): 23. <https://doi.org/10.1186/1471-244X-9-23>.
- Pomper, Stephen. *Atrocity Prevention under the Obama Administration: What we Learned and the Path Ahead*. February 2018.
- Refugee Rights. "Uganda's Refugee Policies: The History, the Politics, the Way Forward: International Refugee Rights Initiative." Accessed February 12, 2019. <http://refugee-rights.org/uganda-refugee-policies-the-history-the-politics-the-way-forward/>.
- Renewed hope for lasting peace in Juba as pressure mounts on Kiir and Machar. Retrieved from <https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/ea/Renewed-hope-for-lasting-peace-in-South-Sudan/4552908-5059940-t95jhtz/index.html>
- Republic of Uganda (1999). *National Water Policy*. Ministry of Water Lands and Environment.
- Reuters. "Report: Islamic State Financier Paid Money to Eastern Congo Rebel Group." VOA. November 15, 2018. Accessed February 14, 2019. <https://www.voanews.com/a/report-islamic-state-financier-paid-money-to-eastern-congo-rebel-group/4659982.html>.
- Reuters. "Marked for Demolition? Ugandans on Pipeline Route Fear Land Loss." August 15, 2018. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-uganda-landrights-oil-idUSKBN1L01D2>.
- Saferworld. *Karamoja Conflict and Security Assessment Report*. September 2010. Retrieved from *Karamoja conflict and security assessment – Saferworld*. <https://www.saferworld.org.uk/.../Karamoja%20conflict%20and%20security%20assessment.pdf>.

Schollaert, Arne. "Natural resources and internal conflict." *Environmental and Resource Economics* 44, no. 2 (2009): 145-165.

"Security Crisis as Uganda Faces ADF Insurgency". March 18, 2012. Retrieved 15 October 2014.

Sengenya, Claude. "Congo's Forgotten War: The Militia of Mambasa." *The New Humanitarian*. April 16, 2019. Accessed April 22, 2019. <http://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/report/102342/congo's-forgotten-war-militia-mambasa>.

Ssemakula, M.E. "Ebika By'Abaganda." Accessed April 22, 2019. <http://www.buganda.com/ebika.htm>.

Ssenkabirwa, al-Mahdi, and Paul Ssekandi. "Uganda: Local Chiefs Accused of Selling Kingdom Land." *The Monitor (Kampala)*, March 27, 2019. <https://allafrica.com/stories/201903270235.html>.

Stonehouse, A. *The weight of history: Ethnic identity and colonial rule in Uganda*. October 18, 2011. <http://thinkafricapress.com/uganda/identity-teso-acholi-lango>.

Straus, Scott. *Fundamentals of Genocide and Mass Atrocity Prevention*. United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2016.

Surf Report. "Legal Framework for Local Council Courts." Accessed May 5, 2019. <https://lawcomm.pepperdine.edu/legal-framework-for-local-council-courts/>.

Tanza, John. UN Blames Uganda, Kenya for Fueling Conflict in South Sudan. *VOA News*. January, 29, 2018. <https://www.voanews.com/a/un-blames-uganda-kenya-fueling-south-sudan-conflict/4229939.html>

The Defense Post. "ISIS Claims First Attack in DR Congo, Saying It Killed Soldiers near Uganda Border." April 19, 2019. Accessed April 22, 2019. <https://thedefensepost.com/2019/04/18/isis-killed-dr-congo-soldiers-kamango-uganda/>.

The New Humanitarian. "Countdown to AMISOM Withdrawal: Is Somalia Ready?" April 16, 2019. Accessed April 22, 2019. <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/fr/node/259323>.

The Observer. "King Oyo Meets Museveni over Tooro Assets." February 1, 2019. <https://observer.ug/news/headlines/59796-king-oyo-meets-museveni-over-tooro-assets>.

Titeca, Kristof. "Access to Resources and Predictability in Armed Rebellion: The FAPC's Short-lived "Monaco" in Eastern Congo." *Africa Spectrum* 46, no. 2 (2011): 43-70.

Uganda Bureau of Statistics. "POPULATION COMPOSITION." 2002, 59.

Uganda Invest. "1.1. Education System in Uganda Uganda's Education System Has Been in Place since the Early 1960's. It Consists of Seven Yea."

Uganda National Legislation: The Anti-Terrorism Act. Part III, Article 7. Section (E) (2017) http://www.vertic.org/media/National%20Legislation/Uganda/UG_Anti-Terrorism_Act_2002.pdf.

UNHCR. "Uganda Reaffirms Commitment to Protect Somali Refugees." Accessed April 22, 2019. <https://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2016/11/58c69af04/uganda-reaffirms-commitment-to-protect-somali-refugees.html>.

UNHCR. "Document - Uganda's Contribution to Refugee Protection and Management - Study Summary." 2017. <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/64687>.

UNHCR. "Uganda's IDP Camps Start to Close as Peace Takes Hold." Accessed April 9, 2019. <https://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2007/9/46e6a68013/ugandas-idp-camps-start-close-peace-takes-hold.html>.

UNHCR. Uganda Operational Update. January 2019. <http://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/UNHCR%20Uganda%20Operational%20Update%20-%20January%202019.pdf>

United Nations. "Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes: a tool for prevention." United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect (2014).

University of Pennsylvania. "Uganda Ethnic Groups." Accessed May 5, 2019. <https://www.africa.upenn.edu/NEH/u-ethn.html>.

USAID 2019 Country Report. United States Institute for Peace. Accessed at <https://www.usaid.gov/uganda/environment>.

USAID Climate Risk Profile: Uganda. United States Institute for Peace. Retrieved from https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/170130_Karamoja_Food_Security_Climate_Screening.pdf.

USAID. "Field Guide: Helping Prevent Mass Atrocities." April 2015. https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/Field_Guide_Mass_Atrocities.pdf.

Verdeja, Ernesto. "Predicting genocide and mass atrocities." *Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal* 9, no. 3 (2016).

- Vindevogel, Sofie, Kathleen Coppens, Lise Derluyn, Maarten De Schryver, Gerrit Loots, and Eric Broekaert. "Forced Conscription of Children during Armed Conflict: Experiences of Former Child Soldiers in Northern Uganda." *Child Abuse & Neglect* 35, no. 7 (July 2011): 551–62.
- Wafula, Philip. "Uganda: What Is Opposition's Game Plan for Busoga Ahead of 2021 Polls?" *The Monitor* (Kampala), April 12, 2019. <https://allafrica.com/stories/201904120092.html>.
- West, Sunguta. "Ansar Al-Sunna: A New Militant Islamist Group Emerges in Mozambique." *Jamestown Foundation: Terrorism Monitor* XVI, no. 12 (June 14, 2018): 5-6. Accessed April 21, 2019.
- Wisniew, S. M. *Early Warning Signs and Indicators to Genocide and Mass Atrocity*. School of Advanced Military Studies, 2012.
- World Bank. "Achieving Universal Primary Education in Uganda: The 'Big Bang' Approach," April 2002. <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/10412/241070BRI0REPL1BLIC10EduNotesUganda.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>.
- World Bank. "Uganda Poverty Assessment Report 2016," September 2016. <http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/381951474255092375/pdf/Uganda-Poverty-Assessment-Report-2016.pdf>.
- World Bank. *Rapid Assessment of Natural Resources Degradation in Areas Impacted by the South Sudan Refugee Influx in Northern Uganda*. October 2018. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/620681548863607633/pdf/134195-WP-P124296-Rapid-Refugee-N-Uganda-Assessment-Report-FINAL.pdf?fbclid=IwAR1RIH4x8i2BAz8pCrZgKVtgBnt1y_5K8hh3mspl55d0k_zlXwdmQZ1q_DQ
- World Bank. *Total natural resources rents (% of GDP)*. Accessed via data.worldbank.org.
- World Health Organization. *Ebola Virus Disease: Democratic Republic of the Congo*. External Situation Report 35. April 2, 2019. https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/311641/SITREP_EVD_DRC_20190331-eng.pdf.



 **GEORGE
MASON**
UNIVERSITY